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An Abstract of the Thesis by
Victoria L. Michalski

The influenza pandemic in 1918-1919 killed more people worldwide in a shorter
period than any other known historical epidemic. Wartime conditions and gatherings of
large groups of people aided disease transmission. Racial segregation in Baltimore and
other cities created overcrowding, and poor living and economic conditions for black
citizens. These conditions affected black health and proved conducive to increased viral
transmission and subsequent influenza infection. Higher influenza infection rates
coupled with lower resistance led to higher mortality rates from secondary complications
like pneumonia.
In my work, I examine the pandemic flu in Baltimore and especially racial
segregation policies that ultimately affected black health and mortality during the event.
Segregation caused overcrowding and poor living conditions. It also decreased the
ability of blacks to receive medical or nursing care in the civilian and military sectors.
Eugenic assumptions about African-American capabilities, in addition to the
overwhelming demands of the pandemic emergency, allowed Baltimore’s white
community to justify their disregard of the crisis in the African-American community.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

In 1918 while America focused on fighting a difficult war in Europe, another
challenge in the form of a highly infectious and often deadly influenza virus loomed on
the horizon. The influenza outbreak in 1918-19, also known as the “Spanish” flu, was
more than an epidemic; this disease spread globally and so was a pandemic.1 The disease
thrived in wartime conditions as troop movements, hunger, and poor living conditions
facilitated the virus’s spread. This influenza pandemic was the last one prior to the
1930s, the decade in which scientists discovered the virus that causes influenza.2
In the years during the war, Baltimore was a thriving manufacturing and trading
center. Shipbuilding, war industries, and their ancillary services provided jobs for black
and white city residents as well as for both domestic and foreign migrants. Baltimore city
had a high proportion of black citizens in comparison to most American cities at that

Michael B.A. Oldstone, Viruses, Plagues, and History: Past, Present, and Future, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 306. Outbreaks of disease involving a large regional area
are epidemics; however, in this work, I have used both pandemic and epidemic. Primary sources
referred to the event of 1918-19 with either term, sometimes using both terms in the same
paragraph. Most local newspapers used the term “epidemic.”
1

Gerald F. Pyle, The Diffusion of Influenza: Patterns and Paradigms (Totowa: Rowman
and Littlefield, 1986), 37.
2
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time, and so it experienced considerable racial tension, much of it visible. Black
migrants found that poor living conditions existed in most segregated neighborhoods.
City ordinances kept them from moving to better housing, and racial discrimination kept
them from filling many of the higher paying jobs available to whites. As in other cities,
racial segregation and legal and extra-legal discrimination became common well before
the pandemic, as did race-based violence. Baltimore was the first city to legislate
residential segregation ordinances that kept black war-workers and other citizens in substandard and crowded apartments and tenements.3
For Baltimoreans, racial segregation proved to be more than just a separation of
races. Segregation created a severe health disparity for black residents, especially during
the influenza pandemic. The city’s black population suffered a high infection and death
rate during the pandemic, likely due to poor living conditions and lack of access to health
care professionals and facilities. Furthermore, while racial stereotyping and segregation
directly affected black influenza morbidity and mortality in the city of Baltimore, it also
led to higher death rates for whites. Though mentioned in passing in other historical
works, no historian has published research of the black experience with the pandemic in
Baltimore in relation to segregation.
Chapter II reviews pandemic related historical literature. Much of the existing
literature focuses on origin theories, disease symptoms, the search for the responsible
virus, and concerns regarding a future pandemic. Medical historians examined the
pandemic’s impact on society, public health theory and practice, and the connections
between living conditions and morbidity during the era.
Antero Pietila, Not in My Neighborhood: How Bigotry Shaped a Great American City
(Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2010), 6.
3
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Chapter 3, “Influenza in 1918,” presents general information about the 1918
influenza pandemic as a historical event, particularly in the United States. This section
describes the disease itself, including symptomology; morbidity and mortality including
that from complicating diseases; public and official complacency at the outset of the
epidemic; later shock at the scope of the disease; the public health response; the role of
the war in spreading the disease; and the impact the pandemic had on society.
Chapter 4 “Pandemic Flu comes to Baltimore,” examines the pandemic
experience specific to the city of Baltimore. Events unfold from the very first reported
victim of the fall wave to the end of that most virulent autumn season. The pandemic hit
this highly urbanized and industrialized city hard, as munitions, shipbuilding, and other
industries put many workers in close contact, helping to spread the disease. In nearby
military training camps, newly inducted men from many areas of the country brought a
variety of germs, that spread quickly in overcrowded conditions. The city’s segregated
and overcrowded black neighborhoods experienced a similar increased likelihood of
disease transmission. Black residents of those neighborhoods then carried the disease to
their workplaces and on public transportation. Inattention to living conditions in
segregated black areas increased influenza spread to other populations. Finally, the
chapter includes an examination of the responses of public health officials, civilians, and
other Baltimoreans during the event as well as statistical data about morbidity and
mortality gathered by the US Public Health Service during and after the event.
Chapter 5, “Early Twentieth Century Segregation in Baltimore,” examines the
long history of forced racial segregation in the city of Baltimore. Racial segregation
permeated every aspect of black lives in Baltimore, including the schools they could

3

attend, areas in which they could live, employment opportunities, and the likelihood they
would become sick or die with any illness. The chapter discusses neighborhood
segregation ordinances, de facto segregation after the Supreme Court declared official
ordinances unconstitutional, local segregation strategies, housing conditions resulting
from segregation, and elements of eugenic thinking and white fear as justification for
enforced racial segregation.
Chapter 6, “Segregation and Unequal Health Care,” examines segregation’s role
in unequal health care for black citizens, the routine racial segregation of black patients,
doctors, nurses, and medical schools, and the access to care and to health professionals
available to black citizens. Racial stereotyping and segregation resulted in restricted
black access to health care, health professionals, and facilities; it also caused increased
mortality in the black community. Health officials acted on germ theory long before the
pandemic hit Baltimore, but that understanding of disease transmission intensified white
fear during the event.
Chapter 7, “Segregation in an Unequal Military,” examines institutional racial
segregation affecting black troops, with particular attention to black units in Baltimore
and at nearby military camps. Overcrowded conditions in military camps and medical
facilities promoted disease spread. Black inductees were typically assigned to work units
in which they endured long hours of hard physical labor. Differences in living conditions
and rations for black soldiers also led to decreased resistance to influenza and
complicating pneumonia. Racial prejudice kept many black doctors, dentists, and nurses
from serving in the military, resulting in a shortage of military health professionals of any
color.

4

The conclusion to this thesis compares the hopes for improvement in segregation
policy with the reality of continued medical and economic stereotyping. This chapter
weighs the possibility of a modern pandemic from a virulent influenza virus similar to the
1918 germ; the potential global impact of a modern pandemic; and conjectures by
historians and scientists about survival during a future pandemic.
Baltimore’s pandemic experience demonstrates that black health affects white
health and that segregation leads to higher morbidity and mortality. Poor living
conditions, inadequate medical and nursing care for blacks in both the city and in the
military, and eugenic assumptions about African-American capabilities resulted in
diminished conditions for the population as a whole.

5

CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

During the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19, an exceptionally virulent version of a
seemingly familiar and commonplace disease killed more people in that short time than
any other known pandemic. An estimated 500,000 to 675,000 Americans died from
influenza and associated conditions, while over twenty million took ill. It is impossible
to provide accurate estimates of the number of people affected by the pandemic, as some
communities did not report the disease and others lacked the ability to keep accurate
records. Despite enormous human loss and societal impact, surprisingly few historians
produced substantial works about the pandemic until the 1980s. The first histories of that
event often focused on scientific or statistical reports, although some examined how the
pandemic affected families, communities, and society. As later influenza epidemics
emerged, historical inquiries began to focus on the pandemic virus itself and the disease’s
effect on the population. Recent historical literature approached the pandemic by
examining and expanding upon medical and scientific data regarding the event. This
historical material included symptomology, death rates, and global spread; examined the
pandemic’s sociological impact; surveyed efforts to determine the virus’ origin
characteristics, and looks at the possibility of its recurrence.
Scientists and doctors reported influenza epidemics for centuries before William
6

Osler wrote Principles and Practice of Medicine in 1892. Published more than two
decades before the pandemic began, doctors examined Osler’s book during the 19181919 event, and historians consulted it afterwards. Osler observed that influenza was a
specific virus, even though some medical professionals and lay people believed the germs
emanated from miasmatic material or that a bacillus caused the disease. Osler correctly
claimed that bacteria did not cause influenza and noted that influenza epidemics appeared
at twenty to thirty year intervals, spreading so rapidly they infected an entire continent in
a few weeks. He also observed that the disease spread rapidly along travel routes, as it
would in 1918.1
Osler described influenza as a serious disease, urging supportive treatment
including confining the patient to bed, keeping them from too much stress while carefully
feeding and nursing them until the fever completely disappeared. He listed influenza
symptoms and noted that the disease often resulted in severe bronchitis, pneumonia, and
nephritis.2 Patients often suffered delirium and took a long time to recover fully.
Influenza survivors frequently experienced cardiac weakness, causing later mortality
from heart failure. Many survivors also reported symptoms of depression well after their
physical issues improved.3
Contemporary pandemic researchers focused primarily on documentary and
statistical aspects of the disease. The United States Public Health Service produced some

William Osler, The Principles and Practice of Medicine: Designed for the Use of
Practitioners and Students of Medicine, (1892; repr., Birmingham: Classics of Medicine Library,
1978),87.
1

2

Nephritis is an inflammation of the kidneys.

3

Ibid., 88, 90.
7

early scholarly articles addressing the pandemic. These works contained medical and
scientific data and analysis written during the event and in the decades to follow. Many
published health service reports compiled death and infection rates, while others analyzed
data, drawing comparisons to earlier reports concerning the epidemic.4 Many
statisticians and writers contributed to USPHS material, but Edgar Sydenstricker’s 1931
analysis linking poverty with infection proved especially significant. His article,
“Incidence of Influenza among Persons of Different Economic Status during the
Epidemic of 1918,” analyzed period living conditions and morbidity from data collected
house-to-house in ten variously sized cities. Statistical study revealed that the influenza
rate directly correlated to the individual and family economic status. This disease to
economic status correlation persisted even when adjusted for the respondent’s color, sex,
and age.5 Another Sydenstricker survey in eighteen communities compared community
size with weekly fatality rates during the second influenza wave. This data revealed a
higher fatality rate in large cities like Baltimore compared to smaller towns and counties
in Maryland and other states.6
About a generation after the pandemic, authors focused on dramatizing the
pandemic and the horrors experienced during the event. Eighteen years after the
pandemic ended, author Katherine Anne Porter published the first novel about the

“Epidemic Influenza: Prevalence in the United States,” Public Health Reports (18961970) 33, no. 4 (November 1, 1918): 1859.
4

Edgar Sydenstricker, “The Incidence of Influenza among Persons of Different
Economic Status during the Epidemic of 1918,” Public Health Reports 121, 2006 S1 (January 23,
1931): 191.
5

Edgar Sydenstricker, “Variations in Case Fatality during the Influenza Epidemic of
1918,” Public Health Reports (1896-1970) 36, no. 36 (September 9, 1921): 2206.
6
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epidemic, Pale Horse, Pale Rider. She described an influenza victim’s suffering
modeled on her personal experiences as well as those of her fiancé. Porter survived to
write her book in 1936, but complications killed her fiancé. Her story outlined typical
symptoms, including delusional episodes and mental challenges.7 She wrote about
patients’ inability to find hospital beds, ambulances, and nursing care during the height of
the pandemic’ the terrors they suffered during the illness; and the positive effect of
palliative care, which was vital to survival.8 Survivors struggled with self-pity, painful
grief, and deep depression. Porter wrote that even after her recovery, everything in her
life felt meaningless, dull, and dead.9 Few other contemporary works covered postrecovery depression or mentioned the mental suffering of influenza victims.
Nearly two generations after the event, historical literature presented medical
information about pandemic influenza as a background to other narratives, but began to
also examine related social issues. These issues included hospital bed and medical care
shortages; individual, societal, and government responses to the disease; and disease
spread in civilian and military populations. Most historians, however, ignored the
pandemic until 1961, when A.A. Hoehling published The Great Epidemic, a narrative
drawn from medical, public health, social, and statistical records. He outlined difficulties
encountered by medical professionals in diagnosing influenza despite earlier documented

Katherine Anne Porter, Pale Horse, Pale Rider (1936; repr., Chapel Hill: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 191.
7

8

Ibid., 183, 196.

9

Ibid., 204.
9

influenza epidemics like the pandemic in 1889-1890.10 Hoehling described flu remedies
of the era, such as tobacco juice, bloodletting, and purgatives, noting that impoverished
victims sometimes recovered simply because they could not afford remedies that harmed
more than they helped. He dismissed rumors that Germans deliberately spread influenza
of 1918 to turn the war, pointing out that wartime shortages of food, space, and sanitation
endemic, especially in military camps, facilitated disease transmission. Germs traveling
on troop transports helped spread the epidemic quickly throughout the world.11
Hoehling wrote about social and official pandemic responses, reporting that some
public health officials denied the epidemic while others did not admit to disease related
fatalities. To alleviate public fear, some officials released statements that inadvertently
aided disease spread through promoting group activities. The virus often killed people
between the age of twenty and forty, but no one yet knew why. Hoehling believed that
the pandemic completely burned out at the end of 1918, though later authors identified a
third wave of influenza in the spring of 1919.12 He outlined the Public Health Service’s
appeals for help from medical professionals, and described the role the Red Cross played
in organizing nursing efforts, producing facemasks, and mobilizing volunteers.13
The 1970s ushered in new pandemic interest, influenced by waves of influenza

A.A. Hoehling, The Great Epidemic: When the Spanish Influenza Struck (Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1961), 4. The pandemic of 1889-1901 reference was from a chapter
of: K. David Patterson, Pandemic Influenza 1700-1900: A Study in Historical Epidemiology
(Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986), 49-82.
10

11 Ibid., 4,5.
12 Ibid., 8-9.
13 Hoehling., 53, 93.
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between 1967 and 1969.14 Richard Collier’s 1974 work approached the pandemic horror
in 1918 with a military focus, possibly influenced by anti-war sentiment in the Vietnam
era. He recounted soldiers’ suffering with influenza in military camps, while on
transports, and while serving overseas. Collier noted that raw recruits, particularly from
wide-open spaces such as the Great Plains states, fell ill and died at an alarming rate.
However, men from densely populated cities often recovered due to acquired respiratory
disease immunity.15 Collier covered the pandemic’s social impact, focusing on hunger,
overcrowding, and the lack of running water and sewage facilities that plagued the
military as the war stretched resources. 16
Alfred Crosby’s often cited work Epidemic and Peace: 1918 (1974) contained indepth information about the mutating and increasingly dangerous virus.17 Compared to
Collier, Crosby went further in assessing military conditions contributing to the
pandemic. He explained that overcrowding in military camps greatly contributed to flu
infection, and he noted severe nursing shortages in both military and civilian hospitals.
Hospitals overflowed at home and abroad, pushing overwhelmed doctors to exhaustion,
though nothing controlled the disease.18 Public officials actually helped spread the virus
through initial denial of the epidemic and then by allowing Liberty Bond parades, door-

14

Pyle, 137.

Richard Collier, The Plague of the Spanish Lady: The Influenza Pandemic of 19181919, (1974; repr., London: Macmillan London, 1996), 8, 9.
15

16

Ibid., 18.

Alfred W. Crosby, Epidemic and Peace: 1918 (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1976) was
renamed America’s Forgotten Pandemic: The Influenza of 1918 when re-released.
17

18

Ibid., 46, 50.
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to-door bond drives, and other gatherings to continue. Crosby explained that it was
difficult to estimate the disease’s scope because influenza reporting in cities did not begin
until late in the pandemic, and much of the population lived in areas without health
agency reporting at all.19
In the same historiographic era, historians studying public health response to
epidemic diseases in general approached the influenza epidemic from other perspectives.
Some examined responses to the influenza pandemic, while others shared theory and
techniques of public health but did not necessarily apply them directly to experiences in
the 1918 pandemic. In the compilation Sickness and Health in America (1978), for
example, historians Judith Walzer Leavitt and Ronald Numbers declared influenza and
pneumonia “ever-present in society.”20 Paul Starr’s Social Transformation of American
Medicine (1982) said little about the 1918-1919 pandemic, focusing instead on the
medical profession’s development during that era.21 He championed medical authority as
the driving force behind effective public health measures against infectious disease.22
Starr’s work highlights the role physicians played as authority figures during the
pandemic.
The emerging AIDS pandemic in the 1980s and periodic epidemics such as the
Hong Kong flu in 1997 reinvigorated historians’ research into the epidemic experience in

19

Ibid., 53, 101, 56.

Judith Walzer Leavitt and Ronald L. Numbers, ed., Sickness and Health in America:
Readings in the History of Medicine and Public Health, 3rd rev. ed. (Madison: The University of
Wisconsin Press, 1997), 5.
20

Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine (New York: Basic Books
Inc., Publishers, 1982), 87-88.
21

22

Ibid., 138, 247.
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general, often focusing on modern scientific interpretations based on new research
abilities.23 Authors increasingly asked why the 1918 pandemic was so fatal and what
could prevent another killer influenza virus. They explained the search for the
pandemic’s viral origin and specific form and causes for its unprecedented mortality
rates. Most modern works present a “crime-scene investigator” character, as historians
present the scientific efforts identify the killer of 1918 and prevent it from killing again.
The disease’s virulence and high mortality pushed scientists to begin research on
active influenza and pneumonia cases even while the pandemic continued. Many major
health and medical associations in America and Europe launched studies in 1918, and
influenza research dominated every medical meeting and journal for years, even after the
pandemic ended. Flu research funding came from insurance companies, the federal
government, and universities.
In 1997, immunologist Jeff Taubenberger extracted the 1918 influenza virus from
a warehoused and forgotten preserved lung tissue sample and read its genetic
information.24 Taubenberger had joined the Armed Force Institute of Pathology (AFIP)
in 1993; the eventual success of his influenza project validated the need for the Institute
to continue to maintain millions of tissue samples in warehouses at taxpayer expense.25

J.C. De Jong, E.C.J. Claas, A.D.M.E. Osterhaus, R. G. Webster, and W. L. Lim. “A
Pandemic Warning?” Nature 389, no. 554 (October 9, 1997): 554.
23

Oldstone, 319; John M. Barry, The Great Influenza: The Epic Story of the Deadliest
Plague in History (2004, repr., New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 407.
24

Pete Davies, The Devil’s Flu: The World’s Deadliest Epidemic and the Scientific Hunt
for the Virus That Caused It (New York: Henry Holt and Company Publishers, 2000), 208, 211212.
25
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The 1918 virus was an influenza form no one had previously seen.26 The new research
revitalized interest in the pandemic, prompting a surge in historical works for the popular
audience.
One example of this approach to influenza history was Gina Kolata’s 1999 work,
Flu: The Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search for the Virus
that Caused It.27 Kolata explained and expanded on Taubenberger’s work, describing the
virus as an avian strain that jumped directly to humans with few genetic changes.
Countering other authors’ warnings about possible future virulent and lethal pandemics,
Kolata explained that after re-creating and studying the 1918 virus, Taubenberger’s group
found all available anti-viral drugs completely stopped the killer virus. Most people carry
partial immunity to the 1918 microbe because today’s flu viruses are direct descendants.
The antibodies against more recent viruses partially block the pandemic one.28
Pete Davies’ The Devil’s Flu: The World’s Deadliest Epidemic and the Scientific
Hunt for the Virus That Caused It (2000) was another of these popular histories. He
provided detail about Hemagglutinin and Neuraminidase proteins in influenza viruses,
explained virus classification, how viruses work, and how various viral strains contain
different proteins. He questioned pandemic fatality estimates due to reporting
deficiencies in Africa, China, and Latin America and in rural areas worldwide.
Discoveries in the new millennium revealed that the 1918 virus, like most viruses, caused

26

Ibid., 217, 219.

Gina Kolata, Flu: The Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search
for the Virus that Caused It (1999; repr., New York: Touchstone Books, 2005).
27

28

Ibid, 313-14.
14

“cytokine storm” which explained many victims’ purple appearance and the fluid that
effectively drowned their lungs. Cytokine storm complications killed many strong and
young people in the prime of their lives. Dismissing Taubenberger and Kolata’s
optimism, Davies argued that one-hundred million people could die in a pandemic
influenza outbreak with similar virulence to 1918.29 Davies wrote that respiratory
disease, particularly pneumonia common with the 1918 influenza, took a greater toll
among the poorly fed.30 He debunked previously held theories that the influenza
originated at Camp Funston in Kansas, describing an influenza outbreak in Spain a month
before the flu hit Funston. He cautioned readers not to take influenza lightly, as even in a
non-pandemic year it killed from ten- to fifteen-thousand Americans, and more than
40,000 in a bad year. Antigen-shift and problems with virus mutation made effective
inoculations difficult to produce, especially with new and quickly emerging flu strains.
Davies remained cautionary about a new pandemic, arguing that anti-viral drugs were not
especially effective even when administered in time.31
At the same time that there was a surge in these popular histories, medical
historians were expanding on their social history approach to disease. Nancy Tomes’
1998 work about germ theory, for example, proved vital information for understanding
microbe combatting techniques used by public and public health officials, though she
provided little specific to the 1918 pandemic. However, the work explored diseaserelated class and social interactions in the early twentieth century; one of the first

29

Davies, 44.

30

Ibid., 47.

31

Ibid., 69.
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histories to do so in detail. Tomes noted that middle-class Americans associated poor,
immigrant, and non-white people with germs. These stereotypes resulted in class
prejudice, nativism, and racism.32 She also argued that some converts to germ theory
believed in a “chain of disease” linking all Americans in the entire society together.
These reformers worked to address poor, minority, and immigrant health problems
because they believed that one group’s problems affected everyone. As pandemic fear
gripped the nation, some people abandoned sick relatives and neighbors to die, revealing
anxieties connecting contagion and infection with widespread germ theory education.33
In 2004, John Barry wrote an in-depth pandemic account that brought together the
various new historiographical interpretations. He examined the evolution of scientific
medical research, medical school standards and improvements, and era leaders in medical
science and public health relative to the pandemic, but he also explained political and
sociological factors. He discussed political maneuvering in military, medical, and
scientific circles, including how those actions affected soldiers and civilians during the
pandemic. He criticized preventable deaths from overcrowding in military camps and
from large group activities such as Liberty Bond rallies.34 In addition, Barry described
the little-examined 1919 influenza wave. He noted the meagre period literature about the
pandemic, surmising that intense fear and helplessness kept survivors from reliving and

Nancy Tomes, The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women, and the Microbe in American Life
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998), 11-12.
32

33

Ibid., 246.

34

Barry, The Great Influenza: The Study of the Greatest Pandemic in History, 213.
16

writing about their experience.35 Barry wrote that scientists and public health officials
still disagreed with research results concerning the 1918 microbe’s origin and virulence.
He explained that from 1918 on, most pandemic researchers believed their own work
even if it was wrong.36
In a reconsideration of Collier’s and Crosby’s arguments, Carol Byerly focused
her 2005 work on the pandemic’s impact on the American military in World War I and
on how army medical officers and other government officials responded to the crisis.37
Like Collier and Crosby, Byerly linked the epidemic’s spread with military mobilization
and overcrowding, but she added an analysis of race. In 1918 and 1919, medical
professionals sought to reinforce their elite and superior status by defining all medical
officers as white males.38 Over concern that medical officer commissions would put
female or black physicians in a position to command white males, the military excluded
them.39 Byerly wrote that some physicians, medical officers, and other officials writing
after the pandemic scapegoated minority groups for the disease outbreak. These reports
blamed minority soldiers’ racial characteristics for their infection rather than admitting
that Army facilities provided poor and overcrowded living conditions. Byerly surveyed
the scientific literature and data, finding that the determining factors for infection and

35

Ibid. 392-4.

36

Ibid., 417.

Carol R. Byerly, Fever of War: The Influenza Epidemic in the U.S. Army during World
War I (New York: New York University Press, 2005), 7.
37

38

Ibid., 15.

39

Ibid., 30.
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death during the pandemic were economic, social, political, and physical, not racial.40
In 2006, Taubenberger and Morens published their scientific work on the 1918
virus in a concise report. They wrote that almost all cases of influenza A worldwide
since 1918 descended from the pandemic microbe, even human infections from avian
viruses. These descended viruses included “drifted” and re-assorted or mutated viruses.
Genetic material isolated from Taubenberger’s original tissue sample confirmed that all
four known human and swine lineages probably descended from the 1918 virus. Avian
flu versions contained virus genes from 1918 combined with avian virus genes. The
“mother of all pandemics,” all later influenza viruses descended from the 1918 pandemic
virus. Tauberberger and Morens discussed competing virus origin theories, dismissing
each in turn. They mentioned recent genetic testing suggested the 1918 virus originally
derived from an avian-like influenza virus, though the authors insist there is not enough
data to know definitively.41
Taubenberger and Morens cited research suggesting that the pandemic virus of
1918 was novel and unique to humans, jumping from an animal host through mutation.
Unprecedented fatalities resulted because the virus was new, so no human had immunity
to it. Unfortunately, with no pre-1918 influenza tissue samples available, the theory
remains unprovable.42 As in other twenty-first century works, the authors discussed a
future pandemic. They wrote that even with modern antiviral and antibacterial drugs, flu

40

Ibid., 156, 170.

Jeffery K. Taubenberger and David M. Morens, “1918 Influenza: the Mother of All
Pandemics,” Emerging Infectious Diseases 12, no. 1 (January 2006): 15-17.
41

42

Ibid., 17-18.
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vaccines, and prevention techniques, a 1918 virus pandemic could likely kill in excess of
one-hundred million people worldwide.43
Pandemic questions continue to attract scientists and researchers from many
different disciplines. In 2007, anthropologists and biologists Cassidy, Palmer, and
Sattenspiel studied virus immunity and disease spread on the island of Newfoundland.44
They addressed various transportation modes as viral distribution agents between
communities, examining shipping, boat, and railroad travel, and accounting for
immunities gained during exposure to the less fatal spring 1918 influenza outbreak.
Writing in 2008, Petit and Bailie described the viral to bacterial interactions that made
influenza and pneumonia together nearly impossible to survive in 1918. They also added
to the few historical works listing disproportionate depression as a pandemic symptom.45
The historians described unusually high death rates in twenty to forty-year-old people in
comparison to other epidemics when the oldest and youngest people died in larger
numbers. They argued that the cytokine storm, which Davies had described, caused
strong young people to die because they had the strongest immune response to the virus.
Pettit and Bailie listed post recovery issues like vascular and nervous system damage,
fatigue, psychosis, tachycardia, encephalitis, and related sudden death.46 The authors
discussed particularly high pneumonia rates among black troops in the military. The

43

Ibid., 22.

Chris Cassidy, Craig T. Palmer, and Lisa Sattenspiel, “Boats, Trains, and Immunity:
the Spread of the Spanish Flu on the Island of Newfoundland,” Newfoundland and Labrador
Studies 22, no. 2 (2007): 476.
44

Dorothy A. Pettit and Janice Bailie, A Cruel Wind: Pandemic Flu in America 19181920 (Murfreesboro: Timberlane Books, 2008), 3.
45

46

Ibid., 11, 30.
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military commission accepted no blame, stating that black soldiers had lower resistance
to pneumonia after their typhus vaccinations and ignoring that racial segregation and
overcrowding caused the disease to spread quickly in black barracks.47
In 2010, Patricia Fanning examined sociological and physical pandemic effects in
a small Massachusetts town and particularly in the immigrant enclaves.48 Social division
between different neighborhoods based on immigrant group membership, affluence, and
job category, created stratified neighborhoods. Businessmen, bankers, and officials lived
in one area, while everyone else including the poor and immigrants lived outside that
area.49 Progressive era reformers believed immigrants required training into “right”
American thinking and behavior, while social Darwinists believed the poor and
immigrants were simply unfit. The pandemic exacerbated anti-immigrant fear and
divisiveness. Quarantines, disinfection, and preventative health regulations imposed on
the poor and immigrants but not the wealthy represented control strategies and political
backlash against already marginalized victims. Public health workers often assessed
blame for their own sickness on immigrants and minorities or judged assistance needs
based on era morality ideals. Influenza provided an excuse to implement discriminatory
policies. The poor and immigrants resisted regulations, ignored quarantines, and
disregarded bans on assembling, and in response, the elite viewed lower class resistance
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as proof that inherent disorder, evil, and lawlessness caused disease.50 Seeming to
validate these prejudices, marginalized groups had higher morbidity and mortality rates
during the pandemic. However, the poor and immigrants were often less knowledgeable
about disease and had less access to medical care. Along with poverty and overcrowding,
these issues accounted for the higher infection and death rates. Fanning characterized
likely epidemic victims as young adults, lower class, foreign born or minority.51
Other recent works continued a social and cultural approach to the disease. In
2010, Nancy Tomes wrote about pandemic era public health measures including disease
control strategies and public resistance, school closures, facemask regulations, and public
venue closures.52 Nancy Bristow’s 2012 work described the actions of public health
officials who created initiatives to help avoid the flu.53 However, progressive era health
care activism and efforts did not apply to everyone in American society. White
supremacist notions resulted in sub-standard health care and aid for the poor and
minorities affected by the pandemic. Race, class, and gender differences shaped public
responses, as poor and lower class citizens suffered prejudice, indignities, and
inequalities.54 Echoing Bristow, Adams and Butterly argued that in an increasingly
global society, poor public health conditions create conditions perfect for new pathogens
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to arise, increasing the chance of diseases spreading to other populations.55
Overall, pandemic influenza histories examined and expanded upon medical and
scientific data regarding the event including symptoms, death rates, and worldwide
distribution. They examined the sociological impacts of the pandemic, and presented
research into the virus origin, characteristics, and recurrence prevention. Modern
understanding of pandemic disease reveals that class, ethnic, and racial prejudices only
serve to alienate sufferers and do not protect elite or majority groups from infection. A
“them” and “us” mentality will cost lives when another infectious disease pandemic
arises. Any disease that affects the smallest, poorest, or most downtrodden can ultimately
spread to infect all people.
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CHAPTER III

INFLUENZA IN 1918
In 1918, many people became observably sick, but “silently infected” individuals
also helped spread the virus since they remained well but unaware of their potential as
carriers.56 It is important to relate the details of this frightening disease, including its
possible origin, effect on society, and resulting public health response to understand the
effect that racial segregation wrought on the segregated black population in Baltimore.
Historical records of influenza epidemics spanned many centuries prior to the
pandemic in 1918, including notable outbreaks in 1833, 1847-8, and 1889-90.57 In
classical times, Hippocrates recorded a flu-like infection that spread sickness and killed
off most of an Athenian army in 412 BCE.58 In modern times, the pandemic of 1889 90
remains the first well-documented influenza epidemic, although the influenza of 1918
was more virulent and caused more deaths. The 1889 pandemic came as a complete
surprise at a time of major socio-economic adjustments from rapid urbanization and
industrialization, spreading rapidly from cities to the countryside via new canals and
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roads, assisted by the growth of railroads and steamship lines. Doctors realized that a
microorganism caused the disease, and they looked to Pfeiffer’s bacillus as a possibility.
Yet even though the 1889 pandemic occurred so recently, the 1918 pandemic seemed to
catch the world unprepared.59
The 1918 Spanish flu pandemic took the name “Spanish Flu” because reports of
the disease came first from Spain, one of the only countries in the world not censoring
wartime news.60 World War I hastened the spread of the disease, and the drift and
mutation of the viral strain made it increasingly dangerous as it spread via international
travel. The spring influenza wave attracted little attention until the fatal fall wave took
far more lives, including disproportionate numbers of young adults.61
The disease hit people quickly, weakening and then prostrating them. In the first
wave of 1918, newly infected felt weak and tired, as if coming down with a cold. About
two days later, they developed a cough and felt pain behind the eyes, in the ears, and
along the spine. Drowsy numbness invaded as the fever began to rise, often topping onehundred four degrees. Patients experienced unstable pulse, and the muscle pain became
nearly unbearable. In the spring wave, most patients recovered after three horrible days,
but in the fall second wave, the disease changed.62
Like the spring wave, the fall influenza wave struck rapidly. The sick
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experienced sudden nosebleeds, bloody sputum, and extreme lethargy. Some people fell
ill and died within hours, while others remained sick for three or four days to a few
weeks. For many, pneumonia soon overtook the influenza, as lungs filled with fluid and
caused a blue or purple coloring on the patient’s limbs and face; the appearance of a blue
or gray tint to the skin signified impending death.63 Even those who survived endured
long-term health problems.64
The 1918 influenza disproportionately killed young people in their prime, unusual
as influenza normally kills mostly the very young and very old. Overall fatality rates in
this epidemic spiked higher for young adults, indigenous, and other relatively closed
populations such as segregated blacks and immigrant groups, and certain military and
occupational subgroups than for the majority population.65 Scientists disagreed over
reasons why some groups suffered higher mortality. Some scientific studies in the new
millennium postulated that a dangerously strong immune response called cytokine storm
set off a lethal over-reaction in those infected with the flu and pneumonia. However,
scientists investigating at the Universities of Arizona and Edinburgh have argued that
people born after about 1900 gained immunity to the new virus because of exposure to a
weaker version circulating for at least ten years prior to the pandemic. A similar flu
strain circulating in the early to mid-1800s likely protected older people from the 1918
virus. The twenty to forty year olds were victims of timing, as they did not develop
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adequate defenses to the 1918 flu, even if exposed to the 1889 virus.66
Many scientists, doctors, and historians continue to work to identify reasons for
the unusual mortality characteristics of the pandemic virus. Scientific analysis of
cytokine storm theories led some researchers in the twenty-first century to determine that
most deaths from the H1N1 strain in the 1918-1919 pandemic occurred not from an overactive immune response, but from hemorrhagic pneumonia that caused the patient to go
into acute respiratory distress. Healthcare providers, medical experts, and data published
in the pandemic period suggest that such deaths occurred because of secondary bacterial
pneumonia and not from the influenza virus. Further, most people who suffered from the
pandemic influenza without secondary pneumonia recovered from the disease.67
Though many scientists searched for the cause of mortality patterns seen in 1918,
others looked for the origin of the virus. The most repeated, yet now disputed, origin
theory is that the virus made its first appearance in Haskell County, Kansas, in January
1918. From this sparsely populated area, the virus spread three hundred miles west to
Camp Funston and caused an outbreak in the overcrowded army training camp.68 In this
concentrated population of young men with new germs constantly arriving from all over
the region, influenza spread quickly, resulting in an epidemic in March of 1918. As
many as five hundred soldiers reported to the camp hospital within a week. Most patients

Carl Zimmer, “In 1918 Flu Pandemic, Timing Was a Killer,” The New York Times,
April 30, 2014.
66

67

Brundage and Shanks, 1193-94.

68

Camp Funston was later renamed Fort Riley.
26

recovered within a month, and it seemed that the flu outbreak passed.69 However, from
Camp Funston the infection spread as the soldiers traveled and interacted with other
soldiers.70
The second and more virulent wave struck America in the fall of 1918.71 Many
historians believe that overcrowded conditions in army camps, bunkers, transport ships,
and European military installations produced fertile environments that promoted
widespread influenza transmission during both the spring and fall waves. War
mobilization and transportation meant that soldiers spread infectious disease microbes
overseas and back to America, killing more people with influenza than war.72
Some scientists argued that the pandemic originated in Asia; the virus spread
when Chinese or Vietnamese laborers came to the United States or went to France to
work during the war. Another theory is that the pandemic began in a British Army post
in France in 1916 from an outbreak of “purulent bronchitis” resembling the 1918
influenza. These and other origin theories are still in contention, and work on
discovering the pandemic origin continues.73 Some lay people and physicians, presented
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doubtful evidence that the same microbe had caused the Black Death plague in Europe.74
Others reverted to older miasmic theories, believing the disease cause as “bad air.”75 Still
others studying the pandemic agreed that the epidemic started in Asia, probably China,
but blamed initial transmission on workers imported to British army camps in
Madagascar.76
One fifth of the world’s population got the flu in 1918-19, with a twenty-eight
percent infection rate in the United States. Estimates put worldwide deaths from 20
million to more than 100 million, but since some places kept no records and no definitive
tests for the flu existed, the actual number remains unclear.77 Between twelve and
thirteen million people died in India alone during the winter of 1918-1919.78 The
influenza pandemic killed about one of every three hundred thirty-three people in the
United States.79 By December 1918, the Public Health Service estimated that at least
370,000 Americans had already died in the epidemic.80 The metropolitan centers of
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Philadelphia, Baltimore, Washington D.C. and San Francisco suffered most in mid to late
September, and New York City joined them in October with high mortality reports.81
The flu claimed more lives in a few months than World War I did in four years of
fighting.82 Experts today estimate conservatively that over 675,000 Americans died in
the pandemic, 500,000 more than died from influenza in a typical season. Prior influenza
pandemics killed about one-tenth of one percent of those infected, while the 1918
pandemic fall wave killed about two and a half percent of those infected. Most deaths
resulted from bacterial pneumonia.83
The flu infected people from every occupation. Soldiers died in great numbers,
people of every class, nationality, and color died in the streets and in their homes, and
doctors and nurses helping the ill died from the disease. Even President Woodrow
Wilson became gravely sick, and doctors gave him orders to take a long rest to
rehabilitate. On October 12, alarmed citizens questioned Wilson’s level of disability
amid concerns that advisors and others actually stepped in to run the country.84 By
October 18, newspaper reports noted that Wilson might not resume his duties.85
The public felt especially disturbed that so many people died in the pandemic’s
fall wave because advances in bacteriology and public health encouraged them to believe
that doctors and scientists could cure almost everything. By 1918, scientists had
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developed vaccines for some diseases, identified the bacteria responsible for tuberculosis,
and reduced infections from insect spread diseases like malaria and yellow fever.86 The
public expected scientists and doctors to help them by quickly identifying the germ and
making a vaccine to cure it. However, doctors knew so little about the disease that even
properly diagnosing patients became nearly impossible.87
Medical professionals admitted that they did not know exactly what caused the
illness, as this influenza did not look like other flu strains. In fact, doctors attending a
1918 meeting of the American Public Health Association in Chicago disagreed
vehemently over the best methods to stop the disease spread, and those in attendance
admitted they had no effective strategy to combat influenza.88 They could only advise
people to avoid excesses and strains to their resistance and to rest if they felt any
symptoms. The doctors also offered divergent opinions regarding the various influenza
and pneumonia vaccines in production or use at the time; many doctors opposed
indiscriminate use of “stock vaccines,” saying that vaccines should be limited to medical
study until fully verifying their effectiveness.89 Unfortunately, no vaccines produced for
this influenza worked despite contradictory claims of effectiveness, and no criteria
existed for valid vaccine trials.
Researchers studied tissue and fluid samples, often revealing Pfeiffer’s Bacillus,
so many doctors believed it the probable cause of influenza and vaccinated against the
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bacillus accordingly. However, even before the turn of the twentieth century, doctors like
Osler found compelling evidence against Pfeiffer’s bacillus as an influenza cause.90
Doctors inoculated thousands of people with dozens of different newly developed
vaccines, but none slowed the disease. People often turned to folk cures because
mainstream medicine offered no cure, but again, nothing seemed to help.91 Doctors with
limited experience and learning sometimes prescribed tobacco juice, limejuice, emetics,
purgatives, and in desperation even resorted to the obsolete practice of bleeding patients
until they looked pale. Historian Hoehling wrote that impoverished patients seemed to
recover more easily from the flu because they could not afford to seek care that often
harmed more than helped.92 Those suffering from bacterial pneumonia rarely survived
with or without treatment.
As the fall wave wore on, the pandemic caused great disruptions in communities
as it caused more sickness; continued to spread quickly, and killed many more people.
Families struggled to deal with the sickness and death of loved ones, and society
attempted to deal with the confusion and chaos the epidemic caused. The pandemic
paralyzed vital services like police and fire departments as so many people got sick that
the rest could not pick up the slack. Other services like public transportation, telephone
service, sanitation, railroads, factories, mills, merchants, and others suffered similar
problems as employees fell ill. Doctors and nurses normally available to help tend the
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sick were overseas assisting in the war effort.93 Medical professionals remaining in the
country found themselves overwhelmed by the number of patients as the disease moved
through military bases, towns, and cities.94 Some families had multiple members sick at
the same time, all bedridden and unable to get up whatsoever. The Baltimore Red Cross
reported several cases when nurses encountered two or three sick patients in one bed at a
time, sometimes along with a dead body. Sometimes family members were so sick they
did not know a loved one died. Children in homes with sick parents sometimes
succumbed to lack of heat or food.
Eyewitness accounts described bodies piled up in coffins on street corners or
stacked like cordwood in morgues. Gravediggers, undertakers, and coroners were
overwhelmed, and casket shortages further complicated the situation. Larger cities like
Baltimore encountered problems with bodies decomposing in the mortuaries and morgues
because of flu related delays.95 Many of the dead, especially in poor families, remained
in their homes for days as cemetery officials sometimes charged burial fees and then
made families dig the graves themselves. Undertakers took advantage of the dire
situation by hiking their prices.96 Some bodies lay unclaimed because other family
members remained too sick to claim them. Even the military experienced a casket
shortage. Since casket companies could not furnish the government with the number of
caskets required to bury soldiers who died, the Fort McHenry military hospital devised a
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storage solution. The corpsmen assigned to move the dead soldiers took the bodies to a
designated “peace chamber” in the fort for storage until their family claimed or buried
them.97 This chamber kept the bodies relatively cold to help slow decomposition.
Children orphaned by the pandemic became the responsibility of the whole
community. Older orphaned children often took charge of their own lives and assumed
care of their younger siblings. Communities put some orphans into institutionalized care,
but most became the responsibility of extended family members. Orphaned children sent
to these extended family members often reported feelings of poor treatment,
abandonment and helplessness. Custom at the time discouraged older men from living
alone in a household with young children, so in cases when the mother died, children
frequently went to other relatives or, in cases when the father had financial means, to
boarding schools. For countless children, the death of their mothers caused uprooting
compounded by the loss of their fathers. A mother who lost her husband, however,
generally struggled, often doing menial labor or piecework to keep the family from
becoming destitute. Sometimes children became breadwinners at young ages.98
The influenza pandemic pushed many marginal families into destitution while
poor families already destitute found their situations made even worse by hunger and
need. The poor generally possessed no savings, so when a working family member
became sick even for a short time, the whole family would experience hunger, cold, and
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perhaps homelessness. Sometimes the breadwinner had to stay home from work to take
care of sick family members, compromising the family’s ability to buy food, secure heat,
and pay rent. Sometimes employers fired workers unable to work due to their own or
family members’ illness. Unfortunately, charitable organizations also targeted the poor
as problems, attempting to change their behavior as a condition of granting them aid. Aid
organizations educated the working class poor on cleanliness, sanitation, ventilation, and
isolation in preventing and fighting illness, as if the poor had caused their illnesses
themselves.99
Many influenza sufferers and their families looked to health officials to help them
deal with medical and social issues caused by the spreading disease. The Public Health
Service, founded in the late eighteenth century, contained a mobile cadre of uniformed
and ranked medical professionals by 1918. At the time, health service physicians were
all commissioned officers and all white males. Women and minorities worked in the
health service only as civil servants in roles as physicians, nurses, biologists, pharmacists,
and sanitary engineers. The corps’ main mission focused on disease prevention. Under
Surgeon General Rupert Blue, the public health service oversaw scientific research,
domestic and foreign quarantines, marine hospitals, and undertook statistical studies in its
mission to prevent disease. Public Health officers worked with state and local health
departments to limit disease spread and especially its importation into the country.
During 1918, US Public Health battled not only influenza, but also polio, typhus, typhoid,
smallpox, and other diseases. Public Health doctors understood, in general, how disease
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spread, but they could do little to fight it.100
Despite an already established national public health service, at the time of the
first pandemic wave, no effective, well-financed federal, state, or local public health
network existed to gather available data about influenza and pneumonia. The public
health service proved so ineffective that it could not even recognize the spring influenza
epidemic.101 Few health departments in the US made influenza a reportable disease prior
to the fall of 1918, so few health officials realized that an epidemic existed.102 Only one
mention of the spring wave exists in medical literature because Dr. Loring Miner
believed this influenza seemed somehow different and worthy of notice by public health
officials.103 By late summer, the virus spread to Europe with 1.5 million American
soldiers; they also brought influenza back home upon their return to the states. The
public health service, finally realizing that port cities needed to take action, ordered
medical officers in charge of seaport quarantine stations to be especially alert for flu
patients on ships from Europe. However, federal health authorities did not have the
power to quarantine influenza patients because until 1918, health authorities previously
considered influenza a common and mild disease.
Later in the pandemic, the public health service became more effective at record
keeping and establishing quarantines. By the middle of the fall, public health officials
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used quarantine as a tool to control the epidemic even though these came too late to be
effective. The service began to publish weekly health reports with disease outbreak
information. Unfortunately, until late in the second wave of the pandemic, influenza was
not a reportable disease, so records remain incomplete.104 Still, public health reports give
historians a window into American health during the pandemic.
Local public health officials made decisions concerning quarantines, closures, and
gathering bans for their own areas. Health records reveal that infection and mortality
rates were significantly lower in large cities with public officials who closed schools,
canceled public meetings and gatherings, and instituted isolation and quarantine
measures. However, while quarantine and other interventions helped, they did not cure
or prevent the disease spread. These tactics simply bought time.105
Health departments in large cities took the lead in developing strategies to protect
and help citizens during the pandemic. In New York at the beginning of the fall
pandemic wave, the city had available hospital beds but not enough nurses to care for
sick patients. The public health service advised hospitals to admit only essential patients
and to postpone non-essential procedures. Since the city experienced nursing shortages,
the New York Red Cross conducted a door-to door canvas to find trained nurses to serve
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in city hospitals and to do home health care.106
The influenza pandemic remains significant because of additional problems felt
long after the flu seemed forgotten. Some scientists and medical researchers believe that
the 1918-19 influenza pandemic affected medical outcomes of people for many years
beyond the wane of the disease. Since about one-third of pregnant women contracted
influenza during the outbreak, Almond and Mazumder argued that the pandemic affected
children in utero during the fall of 1918 and spring of 1919 waves. They believed these
children displayed reduced educational abilities and increased disability rates, resulting in
lower income and socioeconomic status.107 Children born during the second quarter of
1919 showed especially noticeable health problems as they developed as fetuses during
the height of the pandemic. Limitations in these children included trouble hearing,
speaking, lifting, and walking, and diabetes and stroke incidence appeared more often
than expected.108 These findings reveal children born after the pandemic as likely to have
long-term health issues that affected them into their adult years, also affecting the type of
medical care they required as they aged. Communities that suffered disproportionately
from the influenza would suffer disproportionate consequences long after the epidemic
had passed.
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CHAPTER IV

PANDEMIC FLU COMES TO BALTIMORE

The influenza pandemic ravaged the densely populated and industrialized city of
Baltimore. Large munitions plants and public transportation put many workers into close
contact, facilitating disease transmission. The Baltimore area was also home to a
significant number of military training camps, where overcrowded conditions aided the
spread of influenza. City health officials tried to minimize the epidemic’s seriousness,
closing only some public gatherings while allowing others to continue, confusing
residents about the seriousness of the problem. While officials banned some crowd
activities, they did nothing to confront overcrowded and poor living conditions in poor
and segregated black areas. Poor housing conditions contributed to higher infection and
death rates from influenza and related complications.
During World War I, Baltimore became an industrial center for the war effort.
Newspapers printed pages of job advertisements for positions in war munition plants, at
the shipyards and dry docks, and for businesses like the numerous oyster and vegetable
canning facilities, textile mills, and manufacturing plants in the city.109 Classified
advertisements also sought men and women for jobs in support industries such as
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transportation, retail, and clerical businesses. Advertisements in the primarily white
Baltimore American and Baltimore Sun newspapers sought “colored” employees for jobs
as porters for the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad or for unskilled and labor positions.110
Baltimore’s population grew as many people migrated to the city to follow wartime
employment opportunities.
The war effort occupied most Baltimoreans’ minds, as newspapers gave little
space to anything else even after the epidemic began to sicken and kill soldiers in nearby
Camp Meade and smaller cantonments.111 The daily papers listed war casualties, paying
special attention to the Maryland fallen.112 Newspapers advised readers about the
military’s need for 3039 more Maryland men to enlist. They also printed local military
camp news, especially about the largest training camp, Meade.113 The first influenza
epidemic cases in Maryland appeared at Camp Meade on September 17, 1918. However,
the Baltimore American paper ignored the flu until October 1 when the disease neared
epidemic proportions in army camps and in the city.114 The army classified the many
soldiers who died from influenza and pneumonia in camps as “dying on the field of
honor,” yet few in Baltimore knew of the many deaths in the army camp just south of the
city. Because the disease hit Camp Meade so early and with such high infection rates, the
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Public Health Service believed that future infections would prove less virulent. However,
as the disease spread along the state’s transportation networks to civilian communities, it
proved no less virulent elsewhere than at Camp Meade.115
On September 19, only two days after the outbreak at Camp Meade, downtown
Baltimore hosted a carnival at the Fort McHenry hospital to benefit soldiers recuperating
from war wounds and disabilities. The carnival attracted thousands of people who likely
spread the disease to city residents and visitors.116 While the Baltimore American still
did not mention the flu, the Afro-American devoted front-page space on September 24 to
the disease spreading to twenty-five military camps. The Army reported 20,211 soldiers
infected in various training camps, with 2,225 new cases reported that day.117 Seven new
camps reported influenza outbreaks for the first time on September 23. On that day
alone, Camp Meade reported eighty-nine new cases. By September 25, the AfroAmerican reported three thousand additional cases in Army camps; bringing the
nationwide total to nearly 23,000. Bacteriologist Colonel William Welch stated that most
late September deaths in Army facilities seemed due to pneumonia that often followed
influenza infection.118
The outbreak at Camp Meade continued to grow, causing officers to consider
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actions to limit disease spread. By September 26, the influenza epidemic affected the
entire training facility, prompting a quarantine to indefinitely prohibit visitors from
entering the camp without prior permission. Commanders restricted regiments to their
quarters and closed the hostess house, YMCA, and bungalows where enlisted men
congregated. Camp officials admitted that some units they hoped to keep healthy showed
influenza symptoms. Doctors continually stated that the worst was over.119 Yet on
October 1, the Baltimore American reported that fourteen more soldiers died at Camp
Meade.120
The military hospital complex at Fort McHenry in Baltimore City served local
army camps by providing nursing and hospital care for their worst cases. Nursing
superintendent Emily Williams organized efforts to bring Fort McHenry nurses to the
nearby army camps to address the crisis. Despite two hundred thirty cases and four
influenza deaths in a single day, Fort McHenry Hospital posted no quarantine. The
nurses moved the worst camp cases to the Fort hospital, effectively spreading the disease
from infected soldiers to other soldiers and staff. The hospital closed its operating rooms
for lack of healthy staff, causing doctors and nurses to do rib resections bedside in the
wards.121 Nurse Williams reported that most flu patients became dull and apathetic and
slept anywhere they could - on chairs, in doorjambs, or in beds. The sick often slept from
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twelve to twenty-four hours at a time. If fever persisted for more than four days, the
patients nearly always had fatal broncho-pneumonia. Frequently when wives and
relatives came to Baltimore to see sick loved ones, they fell ill themselves. Nurse
Williams and volunteers helped these sick relatives find places to stay in Baltimore.122
Despite the growing mortality rate in local camps, Baltimore health officials took
no precautions to prevent influenza spreading to the civilian population. Health
Commissioner John Blake described the disease as the “same old influenza that
physicians recognized and treated for a good many years.”123 However, on the next day,
September 26, the disease killed six more soldiers at Fort McHenry and infected twohundred men at nearby Edgewood Arsenal. Four soldiers from Fort Holabird in northeast
Baltimore County also died. As motor-truck depot drivers, these four soldiers traveled
between camps, interacting with soldiers and civilians along the way and likely spreading
the disease. Another 1,500 soldiers at Camp Meade also fell ill that day. The AfroAmerican warned that the epidemic was sweeping the country, especially affecting
soldiers in Baltimore area army camps.124
Camp Meade officials again reassured the public with falsely optimistic
statements. However, on October 1, medical personnel reported 1,280 new cases at the
facility. Military officers said the epidemic situation was improving, and they expected a
significant decrease in cases. Officials re-stated that Camp Meade’s medical officers had

122

Williams, “Memoirs, 1918,” quoted in “View from Fort McHenry.”

“Meade is Quarantined: Spread of Spanish ‘Flu’ Leads to Indefinite Ban,” AfroAmerican, September 26, 1918.
123

124

“Six More Soldiers Dead,” Afro-American, September 27, 1918.
42

taken action to prevent disease transmission by examining all troops and enacting a
quarantine.125 Unfortunately, many local civilian contractors worked and traveled in and
out the military installation daily, despite the quarantine. These workers spread the
influenza virus to their families and associates in Baltimore.126
The quick spread of influenza cases in army camps demanded finding additional
nurses and aid workers to help the army medical corps. Nurses from St. Joseph’s, Mercy,
and Bon Secours convents in Baltimore went to Camp Meade on October 4, where they
assisted the medical corps with influenza patients and did sanitary work. The Knights of
Columbus also provided relief volunteers who worked with the civilian nurses.127 Since
Camp Meade did not hold nurses and aid workers to the quarantine, these workers
brought the virus into the camp and then back to Baltimore each time they entered or left.
Aberdeen Proving Grounds and Camp Edgewood just north of Baltimore also needed
assistance with two hundred cases of influenza and pneumonia requiring nursing.128 An
article in the Baltimore American praised organizations cooperating in aid efforts in
military camps located in France and at home. They thanked the Red Cross, YMCA,
Knights of Columbus, and Salvation Army all of whom worked to make life easier for the
“boys.” The newspaper mentioned “Protestant and Catholic, Jews and Gentiles” working
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together for a common cause, but there was no mention of black groups or individuals.129
Many citizens in Maryland towns and rural areas looked to Baltimore
administration to provide information about the growing epidemic, but health officials
often misinformed the public. Despite the many deaths at Camp Meade and other local
camps, Baltimore’s Health Commissioner continually assured the public that “no special
reason to fear an outbreak in our city” existed. However, by the end of September, the
situation became more serious as influenza cases continued to multiply. City officials
remained reluctant to take action, resisting school closures and public gathering bans and
insisting that anything more drastic would cause panic and lower people’s resistance to
sickness. Commissioner Blake continued to say that he did not worry about an outbreak
in the city, and the Maryland Board of Health Chief of Communicable Diseases, Dr. C.
Hampson Jones stated that the Baltimore situation did not alarm him. 130
Other Maryland cities and towns provided inconsistent public health responses to
the epidemic. Nearby Salisbury called a public meeting at city hall on October 1 for
citizens, city council members, and health officers. Officials at the meeting announced
the closure of all churches, schools, and theaters until further notice.131 Ironically, the
town called an assembly to announce bans on other assemblies. Congregating in any
capacity served to spread the disease. Baltimore still took no action to implement
closures or prohibit assembling.
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As in other large cities, Liberty Loan events and Liberty Bond rallies continued,
putting people into crowd situations to promote war bonds. On October 1, despite the
growing influenza epidemic, organizers held a huge Liberty Loan event at Laurel Park
Race Track near Baltimore. This special event paid all winning bets in Liberty Bonds. 132
The thousands who attended this rally, the people who worked at Laurel Park Race
Track, and the people who attendees encountered on public transportation likely helped
spread the disease to the previously uninfected. Health Director Blake still took little
action, even though he reported one hundred seventy-seven new cases that same day.
Blake did write to the United Railways and Electrical Company operating Baltimore’s
streetcar system requesting that all streetcar windows stay open when possible to promote
ventilation. Blake’s office also reported that he would survey city public schools to
outline preventive measures.133
On October 2, the city reported thirty-one more victims died, with 2,222 more
cases reported on that day alone. Although Philadelphia already acted to forbid public
dances along with other crowd events, Dr. Blake remained reluctant to order crowd
restrictions for Baltimore.134 Sickness continued to spread throughout Baltimore and the
surrounding area, finally prompting Dr. Blake to institute more public health measures.
Though Blake requested streetcar windows opened for ventilation just the day before, on
October 2 the death rate increased enough to prompt him to change his request to an

“Liberty Loan Events Daily: Col. Winn Prepares for 4th Drive,” Baltimore American,
October 1, 1918.
132

133

“’Flu’ Kills 14 more at Meade,” Baltimore American, October 1, 1918.

134

“Flu Claims 31 more Victims,” Baltimore American, October 2, 1918.
45

order. He also ordered any moving picture or other theater to ventilate their building
properly or close, and he closed all public dances and other meetings in buildings not
properly ventilated.135 By October 4, newspapers reported six hundred new influenza
cases in the city, listing pneumonia as a serious and frequent complication. Baltimore
Mayor Preston gave Health Commissioner Blake a “free hand” to use any means
necessary to stop the epidemic. The epidemic spread so quickly that the Baltimore
American wrote that the disease became more serious by the hour; it had already pushed
hospital facilities and medical personnel to their limits. On the same day, the Johns
Hopkins University’s Student Army Training Corps, the Johns Hopkins University
Homewood main campus, and their Medical School all reported that the epidemic spread
to their facilities.136
During World War I, Baltimore became a major center for war industries. Many
people came to the city seeking industrial jobs. New arrivals mingled with long time
Baltimore residents in the factories and shipyards, spreading new germs and lowering
immunities. Large industrial plants put workers, supervisors, and others in very close
proximity to one another just like in army and navy training camps, spreading germs and
causing new influenza infections.137 Workers took the influenza virus onto streetcars,
busses, and trolleys, infecting fellow passengers and then infecting their families and
others in their residential neighborhoods. Baltimore shipyards also employed many
people, and as expected, these facilities reported many worker absences during the
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epidemic. The Bethlehem Shipbuilding Company at Sparrows Point in Baltimore,
reported that nearly six-hundred men left work with influenza on October 4, seriously
hampering work output at the plant.138 Similarly, the United Railways and Electric
Company reported more than two hundred motormen and conductors out sick with the
flu, affecting the Baltimore streetcar system’s ability to run smoothly and on time.139
Keeping the streetcars well ventilated as per Health Commissioner Blake’s orders did not
prevent the virus from spreading.
By October 5, the epidemic became so serious that Liberty Loan program
organizers cancelled meetings in Baltimore and other eastern cities. Hundreds of
canvassers and speakers involved in prior loan drive activities became sick, and many
died. Rather than continuing their mass meetings, Liberty Loan officials in Baltimore
decided to undertake a house-to-house campaign to raise funds for the war effort.140
Canvassers likely spread the disease between infected residential households. Despite
meeting cancellations, organizers held the Baltimore Liberty Loan Parade as scheduled.
This parade featured 2500 women war workers and mothers passing in review plus sixty
organizations and seven bands marching to promote Liberty Bond sales. Health
Commissioner Blake protested before the parade, saying that the women marchers would
tire themselves needlessly and become susceptible to the flu, and that the overcrowding
of public transportation bringing parade watchers to the parade would menace the health
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of thousands.141 Since Maryland remained far from meeting its goal in the loan drive,
organizers still held the parade.142
Health authorities again postponed a decision to close schools and gathering
places to slow flu spread while still allowing other crowd events to continue. Dr. Blake
initially hesitated to close schools because he felt that parents would not keep their
children confined at home. He believed children mingling with playmates at school was
no worse than children mingling on the streets, using streetcars, and going to movie
theaters, if any remained open.143 On October 7, Blake said that the “flu” was not serious
enough to close the theatres, adding that the City Health Department policy not to alarm
people remained in effect. Blake inaccurately reported a decrease in city cases, though
city influenza and associated pneumonia deaths continued to increase. Influenza also
sickened physicians, nurses, and clergy in contact with the sick, killing many. 144 Partially
prompted by Dr. Blake’s flu decrease reports, the Navy held a carnival and recruitment
event at the Fifth Regiment Armory downtown. The Naval traveling party arrived at
Baltimore’s Union Station in three special railcars carrying five officers and fifty-five
men from ships in the Atlantic fleet. The carnival offered free entertainment for the
public.145 The carnival crowd and naval personnel provided free flu germs, too.
Despite Blake’s reluctance to close schools and other gathering places, other
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officials called for closures. On October 8, the United States Public Health Service
Surgeon General Rupert Blue publicly warned that the disease continued to spread and
urged cities to close their schools and places of amusement.146 The Baltimore school
board then took action to close all public schools, though Health Commissioner Blake
still objected. Thirty thousand students and two-hundred eight teachers were absent on
October 7, so the school superintendent said the schools could not be kept open or
functional anyway.147 Blake finally relented and officially ordered Baltimore public
schools closed, prohibiting public gatherings soon after.148 Eventually most of the white
city schools closed for a time. Some black schools remained closed into February of
1919 when the spring epidemic wave diminished.149
The city death toll prompted Health Commissioner Blake to close churches and
some other gathering places. On October 11 as the death rate climbed, Blake banned
public funerals, allowing only immediate family members to attend limited funerals for
influenza victims. Blake finally closed theaters, shortened store hours, and ordered all
public places keep their windows open.150 Blake ordered public gatherings cancelled or
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postponed and closed all city churches to slow the disease’s spread.151 Dr. Blake did not
close saloons, since the public believed quinine and whiskey effective in fighting colds
and fevers associated with flu.152 He closed poolrooms and did reduce hours for the
saloons, hinting that he might close them if the infection continued to grow. Blake also
ordered dentists to wear gauze masks while with patients.153
Churches in rural Baltimore County, the Maryland Eastern Shore, and bordering
Wilmington, Delaware all remained closed for Sunday services on October 16 and 24.
The closures made burial services for some black flu victims’ home churches impossible.
Some churches circumvented closure regulations by meeting at non-church locations, and
some congregations met in chairs on the street outside their church building to get around
closures.154 Some Christians, like evangelist Billy Sunday, argued the epidemic began as
God’s punishment for the nation’s evil ways. To believers, churches needed to stay open
to help steer the country away from evil and toward Christian salvation, thus encouraging
God to end the epidemic.155 Some people believed prayer the only answer to curing
patients, so evangelists did their part to help “pray down” the epidemic.156 Even with
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closures, weekly church newsletters continued to publish lists of the many sick and
deceased congregation members.157
Church closures and the public health regulations negatively affected many
Baltimore residents. Family members often needed their religious community to help
them grieve after their loved ones’ deaths. Church members believed that orders limiting
funerals to immediate adult family and keeping the influenza victim’s body out of the
building prevented proper and respectful treatment of deceased family members.158 A
Baltimore editorial writer complained that many people did not agree with closing
churches at a time when other gathering places such as City Hall, mills, shops, railway
trains, and trolleys remained open. Others argued that prior epidemics of smallpox,
yellow fever, and influenza never required church closures. Some saw governmental
actions as attempts to turn people away from God. The editorialist noted the many angry,
amazed, shocked, and panic stricken people affected by the epidemic, and that churches
remained the best place to help with their fears.159
The growing epidemic prompted more public health closures. In addition to
churches, Baltimore City closed many governmental buildings. City officials even
ordered the popular Free Colored Library in Baltimore City closed.160 Throughout the
severe 1918 fall influenza wave, the city prohibited baseball games, horse racing at
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Laurel Park, and Halloween events.161 Epidemic sufferers overwhelmed medical
facilities. Civilian hospitals filled past capacity, the military suffered high death rates in
overcrowded military camp medical facilities, and people requesting care overwhelmed
druggists and physicians, yet the epidemic continued to grow. All Maryland counties
reported new cases daily during the fall of 1918.162
Despite closures and gathering bans, Baltimore death rates continued to climb
throughout October. The highest pandemic death rate for Baltimore City occurred on
October 12, according to records collected and analyzed after the event. On October 13,
slightly fewer city deaths prompted newspapers to report that the flu was diminishing,
though influenza reporting proved difficult and spotty. Baseball game and horseracing
bans continued, while saloons and hotel bars remained open with reduced hours.
Pneumonia deaths increased in patients previously infected with influenza. Military
camps near Baltimore reported high death tolls from influenza and pneumonia, as did city
hospitals and the Bayview Asylum, a tuberculosis facility.163 The same day, John Phillip
Sousa’s band cancelled a Liberty Loan tour because the influenza epidemic continued to
spread through military training camps, particularly the Great Lakes Naval Training
camp. The band’s promoters feared that sick sailors coming for the concert might carry
the disease to civilian communities.164
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If recorded statistics are correct, the epidemic hit Baltimore city harder than the
surrounding rural county. An examination of yearbooks from Baltimore County’s oldest
high school in rural Reisterstown revealed that only one person, a teacher, got the flu
between the fall of 1918 and spring of 1919. Student attendance records for the period
noted a lack of absences other than the school’s closure on October 8, 1918 due to the
epidemic. The teacher fell ill in January 1919, as noted in the yearbook’s “day by day
news” section, but later recovered and returned to work. However, the fall epidemic
wave presented a different experience in the city.
As Baltimoreans fell ill, the city slowed down. Public servants, merchants,
telephone operators, and gravediggers became ill and could not come to work.165 In the
worst cases, the patients died, adding to disruption of services and society. As infections
and deaths continued to increase, medical professionals faced more difficulties coping
with victims. The scope of the epidemic so overwhelmed the city’s hospitals, that even
Johns Hopkins Hospital closed its doors because the wards overflowed with influenza
and pneumonia patients. Three physicians, three medical students, and six nurses
employed at Johns Hopkins died in the fall epidemic wave.
So many bodies arrived at the morgue that Baltimore health officials could not
keep up with the death rate so they gave up cataloguing incoming epidemic victims.
Newspaper reporters estimated mortality numbers from undertaker receipts, making exact
death tolls elusive.166 Funeral homes overflowed, causing them to stack bodies outside
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until burial.167 Undertakers had trouble keeping up, and cemeteries became overwhelmed
with bodies arriving faster than gravediggers could dig. At Mount Auburn, one of the
largest colored cemeteries in Baltimore, the overcrowded vaults necessitated stacking
one-hundred fifty caskets on the ground. The church associated with the cemetery
appealed to Mayor Preston for help, so he offered to pay volunteers to dig graves.
Despite five dollars a day pay rather than the usual three, few people accepted the grave
digging jobs. The Red Cross also appealed to the mayor to help with bodies
overwhelming the various white cemeteries, so Preston brought the situation to military
authorities in nearby camps. On November 1, the military called out three-hundred fifty
soldiers to dig graves for Mount Auburn, reducing the backlog from one-hundred fifty
caskets to thirty. The military helped other city cemeteries, where civilian volunteers and
cemetery staff could not keep up with burials.168
Due to the volume of bodies, it was nearly impossible to identify all the Baltimore
flu victims. Some died without surviving family members, and some unknown people
died in the free flu hospital the city set up in 1918. Still others dropped dead in the street.
A Sun newspaper writer presumed these unidentified victims were homeless people with
no relatives or friends to identify them or claim their bodies. The city interred white
unknowns in the burying grounds at Eastern and Western Potter’s fields and black
unknowns at Laurel cemetery and other locations. The city appointed an administrator to
care for the small sums of money found on the bodies. The administrator tried to identify
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and locate family members of the unknown dead, occasionally finding relatives.169 Some
family members also suffered with influenza during the pandemic, making it impossible
to claim their loved one’s body before burial.
Influenza and complicating pneumonia infections spread quickly through crowded
Baltimore area insane asylums. In 1918, insane asylum facilities housed the insane,
feeble minded, drug and alcoholic addicts, and some indigent people. Three area insane
asylums at Spring Grove, Springfield, and Crownsville housed these patients. Two
insane asylums, Spring Grove and Springfield, housed white patients while Crownsville,
housed blacks. In 1918, the state lunacy commission recorded that 599 patients died in a
total population of 5,156 patients in all facilities. In 1919, 740 patients died from a total
population of 5,071. These reports indicated 1918 death rates in the asylums at higher
than ten percent from all causes including influenza and pneumonia. The 1919 death rate
from all causes was over fourteen percent. The Lunacy Commission report attributed the
death rate increase in 1919 over 1918 to the influenza epidemic. The report explained
that state institutions experienced rapid disease spread among the large patient population
and stated that mortality rates in the asylums remained comparatively low compared to
high epidemic fatalities elsewhere.170 This explanation speaks to the Lunacy commission
reporting favorable conditions in state asylums to mask the fact that the asylum death rate
was higher than in the general Maryland population. Statistical information gathered by
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the census bureau in the years after the pandemic proved the report misleading. Death
rates in asylums, when calculated similarly to census bureau death rates per thousand in
population, amount to 116.2 in 1918 and 145.9 in 1919. The asylum death rate proved
significantly higher than death rates of 26.8 per thousand in the city of Baltimore for
1918, the worst of any city in the worst pandemic year.171 This high death rate likely
reflected overcrowding and poor living conditions that asylum inmates endured.
Washington D.C. faced similar challenges during the epidemic. Dr. W.C. Fowler,
health officer for the District of Columbia and National Capital area including all areas
between Baltimore and Washington, warned people not to come to the capital region,
especially to visit sick relatives. Like Baltimore, district health officials banned most
meetings, closed churches, and restricted public funerals. Compliance with health
department orders in Washington was generally high, but police closed three churches
because the church members willingly disobeyed closure orders, stating that they kept
their church open to support their community’s spiritual needs. The Library of Congress
and most other government buildings closed to the public during the height of the
pandemic.172 The public health service made Washington a “sanitary zone” to combat
influenza, requiring the city to institute mandatory closures, stagger open hours for
merchant establishments, and create temporary hospitals for war workers and others in
need.173
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Nearby New Jersey also encountered closure complaints similar to Maryland and
Washington. In New Jersey, only the churches and saloons protested closures and bans,
prompting the health department director to state that “germs were not particular” and
that “saints carry disease like sinners.” Churches foiled closures by using chairs in the
street for meetings, and saloons offered to remain closed at night but received permission
to open for shorter hours during the day.174 Disease transmission continued despite the
best intentions of public health officials.
Since many people traveled and shared germs, public venue closures did not slow
the disease. A black community information column from Elkton, near Baltimore,
revealed that many people decided to visit relatives in New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and
Delaware during the pandemic. Two Baltimore public school teachers traveled out of
town during the school closures, presumably to visit relatives.175 Travelers spread germs
to relatives, friends, and random people they contacted. During the epidemic’s height,
influenza sickened so many local Baltimore and Ohio Railroad employees that the
railroad’s chief medical officer brought in engineers, fire-men and brakemen from other
cities to keep the railroad running. Rail yard employees in the Western railroad terminus
of Cumberland, Maryland, suffered so many influenza illnesses and deaths that the
resulting slowdown caused both freight and passenger traffic in the state to grind nearly
to a stop.176
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Most Baltimore residents lacked access to medical services during the pandemic.
Even affluent Baltimoreans rarely found doctors to help them for two or three days, if at
all, during the height of the epidemic. Because of influenza fears, many people looked
for “emergency prescription” drugs and remedies to safely lessen fevers and keep
sufferers comfortable until seen by a physician. Newspaper requests carefully mentioned
that these drugs could save lives, but only until a doctor attended to the patient. Patients
still wanted “true” medical attention, but understood the difficulties in finding physicians
to treat them.177
Newspapers frequently printed advice columns intended to help people avoid
getting sick. General advice included avoiding crowding, covering coughs and sneezes,
and curtailing germs by not spitting on the ground. Articles also advised washing hands
before eating. Doctors and health officials promoted opening windows to keep people
well, even in cold conditions. Articles advised drinking plenty of clean water and
avoiding cups, utensils, or napkins previously used by others. Articles also
recommended avoiding tight clothing, shoes, and gloves, and breathing deeply in clean
air to help prevent the flu.178 Some articles told citizens to sneeze or cough into a
handkerchief to avoid spreading germs, but others warned people not to constantly worry
about germs flying in the air.179 Advice columns warned that any excesses, unsanitary
habits, worry, undue fatigue, or contact with the infected broke down physical defenses
and made it easier for the disease to attack. Some health care workers in Baltimore wore
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gauze masks to prevent influenza infection, but mask use was not mandatory for most
people.180
Despite much advice, many people became infected. Since sick and dying
patients and their families found few doctors to help them, many people sought miracle
cures. The Baltimore American on October 8, 1918 promised hope in an article, which
said that doctors found a preventative “serum” so the flu would soon disappear.181
Unfortunately, no effective flu serum or vaccination existed in 1918, though researchers
worked in earnest to find ways to prevent and cure the disease. Many physicians and
pharmacists promoted folk and patent remedies because they did not know what else to
do. Advice columns in newspapers constantly related old home remedies and cures to
readers. Camphor became difficult to find in drug stores, as some people believed it
prevented the flu if worn in a little bag on the chest. Doctors promoted castor oil, rest,
milk, and brandy as helpful remedies. In addition, advice columns suggested leaving
onion slices exposed in rooms in the house, and hanging small bags of asafetida on the
neck to prevent infection from miasmic vapors.182 Miasmatic theorists believed that
infectious diseases came from vapors rising from dirt into the atmosphere. People
breathed the vapors, causing their infection. Strong smelling items like asafetida, onion,
or camphor countered these vapors, rendering them incapable of creating infection.183
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Still others endeavored to call attention to the “real” cause of the pandemic as punishment
for the world’s sinfulness, or because people worked on the Sabbath. They offered to
help “pray down” the disease.184
Newspapers mentioned that the public would try anything to cure the flu, so crank
cures continually appeared in advertisement pages and advice columns, despite the cures
being ineffective and often unsafe.185 Baltimore papers containing multiple
advertisements for patent medicines included advertised relief from cough symptoms in
twenty-four hours using a simple home medicine called “Mentho-Laxene” supposedly
made from all herbal ingredients and therefore safe. Users just had to mix it with simple
syrup in the home.186 Another patent medicine advertisement stated, “Catarrh is not
incurable,” telling people not to rely on sprays and inhalers but to buy the advertised
product. This patent medicine product advertised its ingredients as “vegetable blood.”187
An article in the black newspaper during a later influenza outbreak looked like news, but
the story actually advertised a product called “Herbs of Life,” sold by a patent medicine
company in the city. The ad included testimony about the product’s effectiveness from a
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community physician.188 Patent medicine sellers placed multiple advertisements for
various products during the pandemic and in outbreaks in the 1920s.189 Unfortunately, a
number of patent medicines sold during the pandemic caused more harm than help. At
the epidemic’s height, pharmacies prescribed habit-forming drugs such as opium and
morphine for flu symptoms.190
Baltimore experienced high mortality rates during the pandemic compared to
other large cities. It recorded the second highest death rate of any city for the nine worst
weeks during the fall wave with a mortality rate of 6.7 per thousand. Philadelphia
suffered 7.4 deaths per thousand in population, the only city to exceed Baltimore. By
November, influenza and complicating diseases killed more Americans than military
action during the current war.191 After the census bureau tallied data for the entire year, it
found that all cities reported a cumulative death rate of 19.6 per thousand. For the entire
year, Baltimore‘s death rate proved highest in reporting cities at 26.8 per thousand. In
Washington DC, the death rate was 23.6 per thousand. Even Philadelphia, where the
epidemic was unusually severe during September and October, had a lower yearly total
than Baltimore at 24.2 deaths per thousand.192
Statistics notwithstanding, the death toll for influenza and related conditions
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remains an estimate. Health department records did not reflect the true number of
influenza sick or deceased, as officials did not require reporting influenza deaths until
well into the pandemic. Health authorities in nearby Washington estimated that reports
accounted for only about sixty percent of actual influenza deaths.193 Most cities and
towns likely inaccurately reported influenza and rural areas did not report at all.
Statistics did not reflect flu survivors who suffered later cardiac and pulmonary
complications from the disease, the many victims taking months or years to convalesce
completely, or others who died from their complications long after the pandemic.194
The pandemic took a significant toll in Baltimore. The Public Health Service
estimated that at least 75,000 Baltimore residents got sick during the epidemic, and more
than 2,000 died.195 In total, about 5,160 Marylanders perished in total in the 1918
influenza epidemic.196 Record surveys estimate the City of Baltimore alone suffered
4,125 deaths from September 1918 through March 16, 1919, the first day since the
epidemic’s fall wave with no new flu cases.197 The public health service published many
statistical reports during and directly after the pandemic including ages, numbers of
cases, and deaths.198 Their door-to-door field studies in Baltimore and other localities
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examined household disease incidence and economic condition. Canvassers covered
eighteen districts in Baltimore City asking residents if any household member suffered
influenza, pneumonia, an unknown illness, or if they stayed healthy. Collected data
reflected variations in infection incidence among different areas examined.199 Canvassers
listed the number of rooms occupied by the household, their impression of the family
economic situation, information gathered about disease onset and duration, if the sick
obtained medical care, and the presumed diagnosis. The rate for all ages per 1000 white
persons with “very poor” economic status had the highest influenza infection rate, while
those in the “well-to-do” category had the lowest.200 The report did not present any data
for black people.
The relationship between economic status and influenza infection remained
consistent in each locality surveyed outside Baltimore. According to public health
reports, families listed as “poor” had a death rate more than thirty-three percent greater
than “well to do” and “moderate economic status” families, while Baltimore families
listed as “very poor” suffered death rates nearly three times as high as the upper two
economic statuses. The chief health service statistician found that a continued
unfavorable environment resulted in higher influenza infection risk. The poor household
members’ living and working conditions and less medical and care availability likely
caused the higher infection risk. The statistics show that disease introduction and
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infection in poorer households occurred more frequently than in richer ones.201 Racial
segregation in Baltimore contributed to poverty, therefore leading to more frequent
infections and deaths.
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CHAPTER V

EARLY TWENTIETH CENTURY SEGREGATION IN BALTIMORE

After the Civil War, ex-slaves and freedmen in Maryland experienced a slightly
easier time than blacks further south experienced, but they still struggled against racial
hatred and segregation; that struggle increased in the early twentieth century. Race-based
housing segregation in Baltimore spread to all aspects of life for black citizens by the
time the pandemic arrived. Segregation continued past the mid-twentieth century, and
though no longer sanctioned by law, de-facto segregation still exists in Baltimore.
Baltimore was the first large American city to pass segregation housing legislation to
restrict where black citizens could live.202
By the pandemic era, white citizens embraced popular eugenic theories to justify
segregation, unequal living conditions, and substandard medical treatment. The eugenics
movement based its efforts on perceived innate white superiority and natural black
inferiority, and it promoted similar discrimination against many immigrant groups.
While some whites used eugenics to rationalize their racial hatred, others used fear of
disease transmission as an excuse to legislate and strengthen segregation. Segregation
and discrimination permeated every aspect of black citizens’ lives in Baltimore including
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what schools they could attend, areas where they could live, and employment
opportunities open to them. Segregation also increased the likelihood that black citizens
would become ill or die in 1918 and 1919 from the flu or other complicating diseases.
Eugenics was widely accepted in American society from the late nineteenth
century to well after World War II, having emerged and risen to popularity first in
Europe. Theories derived from interest in Darwin’s study of plants and animals created
both social Darwinism and eugenics movements. Eugenicists believed that selective
breeding would improve human stock just as it did domesticated animals. Eugenicists
advocated birth control, castration, forced sterilization, and even euthanasia to keep the
“unfit” from breeding, and they studied skin, hair, skull, brain size, and buttock
characteristics to produce judgements about innate intelligence and tendency to commit
crimes based on physical and racial characteristics. 203
Eugenic theory was popular in the United States, drawing industrialists,
physicians, and politicians to the movement. Eugenic views became similarly popular in
Europe, where related ideas about improving humankind and developing a superior
human race through selective breeding and controlling reproduction later appealed to the
Nazi party. The Danes enforced eugenic laws from 1929 to 1967, sterilizing about
11,000 citizens during that time, more than half of them against their will.204 Sweden
sterilized over 60,000 people, including children of mixed-raced parents, people with
gypsy features, unwed mothers with many children, and habitual criminals. In the United
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States by the time of the pandemic, twenty-two states passed laws legalizing sterilization
for people society deemed unfit.205
This pseudoscientific and racially motivated movement influenced federal and
state government policies and actions.206 Wisconsin enacted eugenic marriage laws in
1914 that required prospective grooms to obtain a certificate from a reputable physician
attesting “physical fitness” for marriage. A Washington Post article about this law noted
that people interested in the “betterment of the human race” watched Wisconsin closely
to see the results of their law.207 Eugenicists published hierarchical rankings of various
ethnic groups that then legitimized neighborhood segregation laws protecting whites from
“biologically inferior people.” White biological supremacy over other races appeared in
some manner in most biology texts from 1914 to 1948, though none mentioned race
overtly.208
Baltimore’s elite white citizens embraced the eugenics movement and the work
done by researchers at the Cold Spring eugenics office in New York. Many doctors and
scientists went directly from eugenic research to high positions in the Johns Hopkins
School of Medicine and Hospital. While eugenicists made some important discoveries
about chromosomes and heredity, they also produced anti-immigrant and anti-black
books advocating strict controls including segregation.209
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Eugenic thinking was widely accepted in Baltimore. Prominent writer, editor, and
opinion leader H. L. Mencken, a Baltimorean, illustrated common eugenic theories in his
memoirs, writing that through careful breeding, supervising black environments, and with
education extending over many generations, he felt it might be possible to make an
appreciable improvement in the American Negro.210 However, he believed it impossible
that the highest black “stock” could ever come close to the lowest of white “stock.”
Mencken, like many of his contemporaries, believed the educated black a failure, not
because he had to deal with difficulties in life, but just because he was black. Many of
Mencken’s readers saw all blacks as inherently low-caste, remaining inert and inefficient
until living in and influenced by a higher civilization. Even then, the “superior” white
race would be fifty generations ahead of them so they would never be equal.211
Because of widely accepted eugenic theories, most Americans did not consider
the overcrowded living conditions blacks endured as a contributing factor to their higher
rates of disease and death. Eugenics labeled blacks as inherently weaker than whites or
other European immigrants. As a result, higher death rates from infectious diseases were
understandable and a condition of the black race. Racial discrimination based in eugenic
belief also influenced black health care access. White health care professionals often
believed blacks weaker, so better healthcare would not help.
The City of Baltimore did not always have segregated housing. In 1880, there
was no formal segregation of any group in city residential housing. Black citizens lived
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in many areas of Baltimore, co-existing and mixing into white and Jewish populations.
Prior to 1890, there was no specific or predominately black residential area in Baltimore
at all. At that time, the city encompassed twenty wards. Though blacks made up ten
percent or more of the population in three-fourths of the wards, no single ward had more
than one-third black citizens. Many blacks came to Baltimore during the Great
Migration, and migration from rural areas in Maryland brought many blacks to urban
areas in search of work.212 Urbanization and industrial opportunities contributed to racial
mixing in most cities. In 1860, just over four percent of all American blacks lived in
cities, but by 1890, the number rose to almost twenty percent. In Baltimore, by 1900 the
black population grew from 54,000 just twenty years prior to 79,000. The increase
amounted to forty-seven percent while the white population in the city increased by fiftyfour percent. The black population increased by 25,000, while the proportion of blacks in
the city actually declined slightly.213 This made blacks a smaller and easier to
marginalize percentage of Baltimore society.
As the black population in Baltimore grew, so did segregation. Limited job
opportunities caused many black migrants to seek inexpensive housing. They rented
shanties and shared small houses with others in similar situations, creating slum areas.
Those who found steady work often moved from slum areas into better, yet still povertystricken areas. Not only blacks lived in the Baltimore slums, at least initially. Russian
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Jews and Poles immigrated to the city in large numbers in the late nineteenth century,
initially facing the same lack of money, housing, and jobs. They found similar slum
housing areas. However, jobs open to white immigrants rarely opened to blacks.
Growing immigrant populations often displaced blacks from neighborhoods on the
eastern side of the city, pushing them west.214
Many blacks lived in sub-standard housing in the western “alley districts” of
town. Alley districts, as the name implies, consisted of large numbers of houses and
buildings located in alleys and minor streets. These homes were poorly ventilated, dark,
damp, and dilapidated with little light or sanitation. A study undertaken by charity
workers in 1907 noted that overcrowding represented a significant problem in the
Baltimore alley districts. The houses were generally old and originally built for only one
family. However, three or more families occupied most houses, called “tenant-houses”
by black residents and tenements by the researchers examining housing conditions.215
Commonly, two houses of three or four families each shared one outdoor toilet, and the
only fresh water came from outdoor hydrants since a third of alley district houses had no
running water. Water mixed with waste often overflowed from the outdoor toilets,
especially during rain. Dampness from this liquid oozed into basements and walls and
collected in the small yards.216 Poor sanitation caused disease; it would later reduce
resistance to pandemic influenza.
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Many black individuals and families settled initially in South Baltimore in one of
the two “alley districts.” However, between 1885 and 1904, half of the black population
moved from the alleys to an area known as “old west Baltimore” because of overcrowded
conditions, frequently polluted shallow wells, and poor sanitation in the alley district.
Not surprisingly the alley district’s epidemic disease rate was significantly higher than in
any other neighborhoods in Baltimore.217 The first black alley district bordered Hughes
Street, appearing in housing reports as the “Hughes Alley District.” After the pandemic,
poor German immigrant families began to move there as black families moved to poor
western city neighborhoods.218 The second became the Biddle Street alley district.219
Charity workers examining housing issues in Baltimore found that unmarried men and
women lived together and the men sometimes gambled; the charity workers passed moral
judgement, stating that these men and women “reached the bottom level of degeneracy”
with an “entirely undeveloped moral sense.” The workers believed that gambling and
cocaine also contributed to low standards, using their opinions to blame black morality in
the alley district for the “poor, wretched, conditions in the district.” Some alley district
families maintained clean and moral homes, giving housing workers more reason to pass
judgements of immorality and misbehavior on residents living in shabby dwellings.220
Workers felt that if one family could clean, so could others.
Segregation became the norm in housing nationwide after the turn of the century,
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and Baltimore was no different. On December 10, 1910, the Baltimore City Council
passed a “drastic plan” to enforce racial segregation in residential neighborhoods. Other
cities watched the ordinance carefully, some enacting similar laws. This ordinance
prohibited blacks from moving to blocks consisting of more than half white residents.
Blacks or whites already living in mixed blocks did not have to leave their homes. The
ordinance provided penalties for people violating the law, assessing one hundred dollar
fines and jail sentences from thirty days to a year. The law closed neighborhoods to
racial change, keeping black residents, particularly those with professional degrees,
employment, and funds, from pushing into white neighborhoods.221 Baltimore Mayor J.
Barry Mahool signed the residential segregation ordinance into law on May 15, 1911,
making it the first such segregation law in the country. Mahool believed the law
“necessary for preserving peace, preventing conflict and ill feelings between black and
white races, and promoting the general welfare of the city.”222
The mayor, like many citizens, believed the slums responsible for most of
society’s ills. Most whites thought slum environments housed criminals and “disturbing”
elements who threatened health and morals, and thus needed constant scrutiny.223
Housing investigators rarely distinguished between slum area homes and habits of people
living in them. To white society, filth characterized slums and poverty, whereas
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cleanliness defined success in the working-class. Higher-class citizens categorized the
poor alley slum-district dwellers as shiftless and irresponsible, overwhelmingly
associating filth with foreigners and blacks.224 Many poor citizens in 1918 still lived in
the slums of Baltimore, shut away from working class neighborhoods. Housing
investigators classified two types of slums; the tenement houses where recently arrived
immigrants lived, and the alley shacks and dwellings where blacks resided.225
Nevertheless, some blacks did rise from poverty and into the black middle class.
The black community considered education, hard work, and home ownership as
mechanisms allowing people to move from poverty to a more comfortable life.
Education and home ownership became a way for black citizens to join the clean and
well-scrubbed larger society and to show their ambition and rising status. However, the
white community did not want blacks, even black physicians and professionals, to move
into their neighborhoods.226
Prejudice in Baltimore included a strong anti-Jewish element. In addition to
developing separate housing markets to segregate blacks from whites as in most cities, in
Baltimore, an additional market developed to cater to Jews. The city divided into specific
black, white, and Jewish neighborhoods and blocks. Occasionally, real estate agents did
rent or sell to blacks even though a block was determined to be white. This rare practice
of “breaking the block” usually occurred after white owners tried to sell to other whites
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but had no offers.227
Black citizens, lawyers, and the NAACP helped fight racial segregation in
Baltimore.228 In 1913, an effort to repeal the Baltimore residential segregation ordinance
went to the State of Maryland Court of Appeals. The Court ruled that the Mayor and City
Council could legally pass ordinances to segregate colored and white races without
conflicting with the Constitution of the United States. However, the court rejected the
Baltimore residential ordinance, but only because the particular wording of the law was
faulty, not because the court found it unconstitutional. The court of appeals wrote that
another valid segregation law would pass scrutiny. The black community believed the
residential segregation ordinance unsustainable because it did not afford proper
protection for a person acquiring the legal right to occupy a residence by valid contract
prior to the date of the ordinance. Indeed, the Supreme Court gave similar reasoning in
its decision to invalidate the segregation legislation in 1917, but it took four long years of
effort by the black community to hear that ruling.229
Mayor Preston continued to press for new ways to segregate the races. Buoyed
by the 1913 ruling, in 1914 Baltimore Mayor Preston condemned the entire courthouse
area downtown because of his fear that blacks living there would spread to the affluent
white Mount Vernon area. Over the next few years the city acquired the neighborhood
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properties, including three churches, law offices, and the office of Harry S. Cummings,
who was the first black elected to the City Council in 1890.230 Most blacks living and
working in the condemned area were renters with no recourse in the matter. As the
buildings emptied, Preston promptly razed them, creating a park rather than allowing new
construction.
Poor health conditions plagued many early twentieth century inner cities. In
Baltimore City, more than one in ten newborns died before their first birthday, and
residents often suffered from endemic disease such as tuberculosis.231 Since the black
mortality rate from tuberculosis was 260.4 percent higher than for whites in the years just
prior to the pandemic, Mayor Preston declared health conditions as justification for
segregating and relocating blacks from areas near white areas. He considered blacks a
menace to white health and advised quarantining them.232 Preston convened a committee
and tasked it to write legislation dividing the city between races; the committee failed to
agree on appropriate bills so whites looked to other methods to keep blacks out of white
areas.
White Baltimoreans looked to other states’ attempts to legislate segregation. By
1915, in agreement with the Circuit Court of Maryland, the Kentucky Court of Appeals
held that segregation did not constitute discrimination, upholding a similar segregation
law to Baltimore’s. The court ruled the law fair because it also prohibited whites from
moving into a block with a majority of black residents. The Court of Appeals judge
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countered that if black people considered themselves confined to less desirable sections
of the city, they should take measures to beautify their neighborhoods. The judge further
ruled that anyone could purchase land or homes anywhere in the city, but they could not
reside in an area with a majority on that block being a different color.233
Individual black citizens tried to fight segregation. For example, when black
physician, Dr. W. T. Coleman moved into a rental unit in a white Baltimore block in
1917, white neighbors called the police and the state’s attorney to force the doctor and his
family to vacate the home. However, Dr. Coleman fought the action with the help of the
NAACP.234 A Louisville Court ruling deemed segregation legislation including the
Baltimore segregation law constitutional, and laws prohibiting minorities from moving
into white blocks legal. The NAACP appealed the case and vowed to take it to the
Supreme Court.235
The case of residential segregation finally went to the U.S. Supreme Court, which
decided the case of Buchanan v. Warley on November 11, 1917. This decision struck
down segregation laws from Louisville, Kentucky that required blacks and whites to live
in separate areas. The court said that states could not restrict or officially segregate
blacks in residential districts. The court upheld the “civil right of a white man to dispose
of property as he saw fit, and the colored person to do the same.” Justice Day wrote that
colored people were citizens and thus had the right to purchase property and use it
without discrimination based on their color. The court also dismissed white resident fears
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of property value depreciation when blacks moved into neighborhoods because property
owned by “undesirable white neighbors” would do the same.236
While the Buchanan v. Warley decision was a positive step against segregation, it
did not lead to integration or even truly help to prevent segregation in the short run.
White community boards formed and enacted restrictive covenants to prevent racial
mixing in neighborhoods, though these covenants often failed. Later, the court reversed
itself by confirming general residential zoning constitutional in Euclid v. Ambler Realty
in 1926. Various states again passed residential segregation laws after the Euclid
decision, though the court invalidated these state segregation laws in 1927 and 1930.237
Unable to justify legal segregation but still desiring black and white separation,
Baltimore now followed two strategies: clearance and containment. Clearance removed
black slums from locations “too” near white areas, and containment prevented the spread
of black residential areas.238 Neighborhood corporations and associations formed to
resist the movement of blacks and Jews into white neighborhoods. These groups filed
lawsuits and obtained injunctions based on agreements prohibiting owners from allowing
blacks to use or occupy their property.239 The Baltimore Real Estate Board added clauses
in their sales contracts requiring white buyers to sign an agreement that prohibited them
from selling to blacks and kept whites from allowing those of African “extraction or
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ancestry” to occupy the premises or land. The city used zoning laws as another way to
segregate blacks. One white real estate board and neighborhood corporation official after
another urged legislation based on the “welfare” of the city. These officials believed
their stated concern for the public’s health would make racial laws pass the
constitutionality test. Overcrowding led to increased disease transmission, as evidenced
by high tuberculosis rates. The Biddle Alley tenement slum area contained one black
neighborhood that earned the nickname of “lung block” because the death rate there from
tuberculosis was 958 per 100,000 compared with a citywide rate of 131.9.240
Keeping blacks segregated in housing because of a disease threat overlooked the
large number of black domestic, laundry, and food supply workers who traveled to labor
in white homes and businesses.241 Additionally, whites and Jews composed the majority
of grocers and retailers in black neighborhoods, and blacks often worked in white
neighborhoods catering to white society’s demand for food and entertainment.242
Residential segregation laws intended to keep blacks from living with whites, but whites
did not want to limit contact with blacks for economic purposes whenever it benefitted
them. Many people in both black and white communities believed Baltimore’s
segregation practices intended to intentionally degrade and humble blacks. One editorial
writer to the New York Times found the Baltimore segregation law a strange way to
remedy racial antagonisms. She spoke against whites intending to crush the Negro spirit
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to build up white standards, saying that it would help whites rise if they would help the
blacks improve and rise too.243 Unfortunately, the white community did not agree.
During and immediately after World War I, the black community in Baltimore
underwent significant growth. The war industries created a need for more housing for
black families. Since many black families migrated to Baltimore, a conference of black
men met to study ways to help the migrants. The Conference on Negro Migration aimed
to help make sure that no one unfairly exploited these migrants and that they had clothing
and shelter. The conference asserted that if property owners and local governments did
not maintain housing standards, people living in poor housing were likely to suffer poor
health.244 As blacks continued to migrate into Baltimore, many white and immigrant
citizens moved from the city to the suburbs. The black percentage of the city’s
population increased from fifteen to thirty, while the white population in the “old” city of
Baltimore decreased by half. This helped with housing overcrowding but did not
decrease segregation or health and sanitation problems in the poor black neighborhoods.
Black citizens continued to live with poor conditions that lowered their resistance to
infectious diseases.245
Black children in Baltimore attended segregated schools. During the 1830s,
Frederick Douglass, a former Maryland slave who later became a writer, speaker, and
well-known abolitionist, encouraged slaves and freed blacks to learn to read. He pursued
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reading lessons on the streets of Fells Point harbor in Baltimore before escaping to the
North.246 Free-black traditions in Baltimore helped black citizens make gains in the city
in employment and in life. As early as 1869, Baltimore black citizens began to demand
the vote, an end to legal discrimination, and the opening of more professions and trades
to them.247
In the early twentieth century, Baltimore had the largest percentage of black
citizens of any city in the state of Maryland.248 Baltimore’s white population grew
unhappy about the increasing black presence and the state’s responsibility to provide
schools for black children. From the beginning, black and white students went to
separate but certainly not equal schools. Funding guidelines for Baltimore schools
stipulated that taxes paid by whites would go to white schools, and taxes paid by blacks
would go to black schools. Limited access to higher paying jobs due to racial
discrimination perpetuated black poverty. Insufficient wages meant less tax revenue, so
black schools remained underfunded and inferior. White teachers and principals ran
black schools until 1900, when administrators began to hire black teachers at lower
wages than whites. Overcrowding added to black school problems.249
The black community came together to provide educational opportunities for
older black children when the state only provided blacks education through elementary
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school. Continued education for black children began in 1865 when a group of forty
black citizens pooled their meager funds to buy a building they named the Douglass
Institute. The institute improved and advanced educational and intellectual offerings
available to Baltimore’s black youth. The institute eventually became Douglass High
School, though initially named the Colored High and Training School. Black students
who attended high school in the pandemic era went to this school, the only colored high
school in Baltimore at the time.250 Colored High remained the only high school for black
students until Baltimore opened a second black school on the other side of town in
1937.251
Although Douglass originally served as a source of pride for the black
community, Baltimore school officials as late as 1913 remained resistant and fearful of
educating blacks. School Commissioner Richard Biggs warned to “stop at once the socalled higher education that unfits (Negroes) for the lives that they are to lead and which
makes them desire things they will never be able to reach.” As late as 1934, a reformer
reported that public schools did not teach black students any skills that would allow them
to work in trades or professions held by whites.252 By 1918, Douglass high school
suffered continued neglect with an inadequate building for class work and had no space
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for any athletic activities.253
Baltimore City’s proposed budget of 1919 illustrated the reason for colored
schools’ inability to attract good black teachers. Black teachers and department heads
earned far less than their white counterparts, even those working in the same school
doing the same jobs. The school superintendent made public statements to the effect that
he did not expect to get good teachers to come to the black schools. Only black teachers
who did not want to leave Baltimore would teach in the city’s colored schools. Other
good black teachers left Baltimore city schools for better pay elsewhere, including
Baltimore county schools.254 Racial discrimination continued as the norm in education,
but a few white educators did realize that conditions, not race, affected educational
success. In 1919, Dr. Charles B. Thompson of Baltimore, a white physician, undertook a
study of children in the school system classified as “atypical” or developmentally
challenged. He reported that he avoided the Negro schools because of racially caused
differences between the intelligence of black children and the white. Although he
claimed that no accurate scale existed for measuring Negro intelligence, Dr. Maxwell of
the University of Pennsylvania found ways to measure the intelligence in both races and
found no difference. Dr. Maxwell noted that economic and social causes explained any
differences in intelligence, when they existed at all. Maxwell stated that children of
either race would differ little in terms of mentality if raised by parents of the same social
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standing and equal incomes.255
Nonetheless, not all black citizens believed racial segregation was negative. Dr.
Ernest Lyon spoke about the good of self-imposed segregation in reference to Baltimore
segregation laws, arguing that sometimes segregation served as a blessing because it
forced blacks to come together. He noted that if black men could get service in white
barbershops, the colored barbershops would have trouble staying in business. Similarly,
he said that very few colored pastors and churches would exist if white churches would
accept blacks into their membership with full privileges. Dr. Lyon promoted the
establishment of businesses and banks in the black community that would keep profits
separate from whites, thus helping blacks to prosper even under racial segregation.256
Many black run businesses did take advantage of these economic opportunities, and the
black community in Baltimore formed its own organizations and institutions. They
wanted a news source to print news pertinent to their interests since white newspapers
rarely, if ever, printed much about them at all, so Baltimore became home to one of the
oldest black news periodicals in the nation, the Baltimore Afro-American. In 1892,
former slave John H. Murphy, Sr. put his and two other churches’ weekly pamphlets into
one periodical that eventually became the Afro-American newspaper. This newspaper
represented the opinions, actions, and concerns of the black Baltimore community before,
during, and after the epidemic.257
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Practices in the early twentieth century perpetuated racial segregation and
discrimination, even in government agencies, such as those in Washington DC, which
continued to separate black and white employees until a few politicians and department
heads slowly began advocating change. Prior to the pandemic, for example, black
women working at the Department of the Treasury remained unwelcome in the large
common dining room at lunch hour. These black workers used a crowded, small room in
another area containing the "colored” lavatories. This practice did not end until the
Bureau of Engraving and Printing of the Department of the Treasury moved to larger
quarters and allowed all employees into the same dining room.258
Private employers also kept many qualified blacks from professional and skilled
jobs, instead first seeking white men, then white women if they could do the work, and
hiring black men only as a last resort.259 Many white employers categorized black
women applying for work as only qualified as potential “scrub women” or domestic
workers despite education, experience, or refinement.260 When streetcar companies in
Baltimore stopped employing white women conductors in the 1918 because the work was
“too hard,” service slowed as the streetcar companies looked for white men to employ.
Even though it was wartime and transporting goods for the war effort remained vital, rail
cars sat idle at the United States Railroad Administration because companies would not
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hire black crews. The Afro-American responded to the situation, asserting that when
people got sick and tired of slow service, the railroad would need to hire proper help,
white or colored.261 The Department of Labor reported such labor shortages that in
March 1918, it began to consider importing black or Asian laborers for unfilled jobs in
war industries and for other employers. The Afro-American responded that black
American laborers were ready to welcome “island brothers,” because the “greater the
number of colored people, the less easily are they lynched and Jim Crowed.”262
The black community continued to fight discrimination and segregation, using
many different tactics. The Afro-American newspaper, for example, carefully suggested
that ministers influence their communities to make efforts in improving race relations and
urged pastors to counsel their members to do their best under all conditions, helping the
white race to see black workers as dependable and efficient, and countering racial
discrimination. Additionally, the paper urged black people to continue to improve
themselves.263
In early twentieth century Baltimore, most black men worked as low paid,
irregularly employed laborers, or servants for white families, though a few middle class
black professionals existed. About half of all black women worked outside their homes,
mostly as laundresses or domestic workers.264 In general, domestic workers worked in
white households. The poverty that resulted from widespread racial discrimination and
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limited employment opportunities would aid pandemic influenza transmission, infection,
and death. Higher infection rates in black communities caused spread of the virus to the
white community through black employment in white households, and through black
contact with white citizens in places of business and on public transportation.
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CHAPTER VI

SEGREGATION AND UNEQUAL HEALTH CARE

Racial segregation contributed to the larger proportion of black Baltimore
influenza and subsequent pneumonia victims. However, influenza was not the only
disease to affect the community. Segregation in medical care contributed to medical
problems for the black community, poor whites and white employers of black domestic
workers. Black health affected white health as white employers then spread disease to
the white community. Eugenic beliefs that blacks were constitutionally weaker hurt
efforts to address the problems of poor housing conditions, hunger, and sub-standard
health care in the segregated black community. Many in the black community
understood that having good care for black citizens, especially in a city like Baltimore
with a large black population, enhanced the well-being of the white race. A few hospitals
in the city cared for sick black citizens, yet facilities for blacks were neither extensive nor
centralized to the population core of the black community.265 Segregation also restricted
black access to medical education, thus limiting the number of black doctors and nurses
available to treat black citizens.

“Dr. Boyle Says he Stands for a Victory Hospital out of Debt and Fully Equipped for
Colored Patients,” Afro-American, November 7, 1919.
265

87

Germ theory and fear of black diseases as an excuse for continued segregation
began during periodic tuberculosis upsurges, long before the influenza pandemic hit
Baltimore. Germ theory promoted isolation of infected patients, whatever their illness, so
quarantine became a major tuberculosis management strategy for public health advocates.
The tuberculosis bacterium spreads through contact with infected bodily secretions,
especially through coughing and spitting, and it can pass to infants through mother’s
milk. Like influenza, tuberculosis proved especially destructive when hunger and
poverty, issues endemic to the black community, limited the victim’s resistance to the
disease.266 Death rates for black sufferers were twice that of whites, and White doctors
often used the high tuberculosis death rate in the black community to substantiate eugenic
claims that the black population was weak. 267 However, evidence suggests that white
employers did not worry about infectious disease when hiring black domestic workers.
Tuberculosis served to diminish individual black citizens’ rights under the guise
of public health. Health department authority excused quarantine, unfavorable land use
decisions, nuisance abatement, surveillance, enforcement, and stigmatization of the black
community, particularly in the Baltimore’s “lung block” area of high tuberculosis
incidence, because whites feared black contagion.268 Baltimore’s Mayor Preston used
this reasoning when he asked City Solicitor Field to draw up another segregation
ordinance in 1918. Preston stated that he wanted to prevent the spread of tuberculosis
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among white people through segregating blacks, who had a higher incidence of the
disease. The proposal Field wrote limited the rights blacks to buy and occupy property in
districts outside the limits set in the measure. This was the same neighborhood racial
segregation as the earlier law struck down by the Supreme Court, but it added wording to
make it seem like it protected the health of the white community.
The mayor did not hold conditions in alley districts or “lung blocks,” where
segregation forced large numbers of blacks to live, responsible for the poor physical
condition of black residents. One author in the Afro-American wrote of inconsistencies in
the Mayor’s segregation proposal. He stated that if the mayor was truly sincere about
bettering all Baltimore citizens’ health conditions, he would propose measures to improve
living conditions among the poor; secure adequate treatment for black tuberculosis
victims; cooperate with educational movements for black people to produce doctors and
nurses; and make beautiful, healthful, and habitable residential areas for poor colored and
white people. In short, the prevention of tuberculosis among the blacks in Baltimore city
was as important as preventing spread of the disease to the white population.269
In his examination of tuberculosis in Baltimore, Samuel Roberts, Jr. pointed out
that “medical racism” existed in the city even while public health authorities looked for a
way to lessen disease infection and death rates in both black and white poor. However,
early twentieth century public health advocates often separated their medical efforts from
the larger problem of crowding and poor living conditions in the urban black community,
leading to very slow improvements over the years.270 Dr. Carl V. Reynolds, who treated
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both Negro and white patients for two decades, spoke in 1917 to an Afro-American
newspaper reporter. Dr. Reynolds pointed out that in disease reports that comparing poor
blacks to poor whites in similar living conditions remained the only way to gather
meaningful statistics regarding each race. In his medical practice, Reynolds observed
that that whites and blacks alike could prevent diseases including influenza, and that each
race responded similarly to treatment in similar care situations. He further discussed the
construction of the human body, noting no differences. He further stated that in both
“Caucasian and African” people, it required a germ to enter the body in order to cause
disease.271
Unfortunately, Health Commissioner Blake did not share Dr. Reynolds’
assessment of disease causation. Though he said that Baltimore needed a tuberculosis
hospital for blacks, Blake blamed them for spreading tuberculosis at an alarming rate.
While many Maryland institutions cared for white tubercular patients, only one colored
tuberculosis ward existed. Because only a few beds for black tuberculosis patients
existed in Baltimore, most black families cared for tuberculosis patients at home rather
than in a quarantined facility.272 The new infectious disease facility at Baview hospital
treated only white patients, making them as comfortable as possible by placing each
tuberculosis sufferer living in a separate room opening directly to the outside. Besides
Bayview, several other tuberculosis sanatoriums opened for white patients in or near
Baltimore. These facilities together provided seven hundred beds for advanced white
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cases. Still there was no facility specifically for black patients and only a few beds in
undesirable areas of white hospitals.273
By 1919, the Maryland legislature grasped the need for tuberculosis facilities to
treat black patients. The State of Maryland saw tuberculosis as such an important health
issue that the legislature appropriated $75,000 for the establishment of a sanatorium for
Baltimore’s black tuberculosis sufferers. An article in The Sun pointed out that white
sanitariums successfully managed the disease. Those facilities were usually located in
restful environments such as the Blue Ridge Mountains, yet the writer said that a facility
in or near Baltimore would be more agreeable to black relatives and friends wishing to
visit patients. Concern about black tuberculosis sufferers was not entirely humanitarian;
according to the article, the legislature took action for the protection of white society.
The legislature believed that tuberculosis among the black population threated the white
population when blacks “go into the homes as servants in a variety of ways, and they
come into intimate contact with all ages.”274 Therefore, building a sanatorium for blacks
suffering from consumption was less a humanitarian concern than a measure of
protection for whites.275
The Municipal Tuberculosis Commission recommended that the city provide
separate facilities, including “superior as well as separate” facilities for whites because it
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saw black consumption a more serious menace.276 Since Bayview Hospital already
housed some black tuberculosis patients in a segregated ward, suggestions included
building a new modern building for white patients elsewhere and turning over Bayview
to black sufferers. The aging facility badly needed expansion and renovation so the
commission promised some money if the plan went forward.277
The city’s plan for a black tuberculosis hospital coincided with city health officer
Blake and Baltimore mayor Preston’s proposal to convert districts where most
tuberculosis patients lived into parks and breathing places. To quiet concerns from white
citizens about tearing down neighborhoods known for widespread tuberculosis infections,
Dr. Blake assured the white public that he would not allow “these people” to move into
or infect other neighborhoods. Neither Blake nor Preston mentioned where displaced
residents of these “lung blocks” would go. Since the only options for blacks with
tuberculosis consisted of home care or a few beds at Bayview Asylum, Blake urged the
city to build the hospital as quickly as possible.278 The commission picked a site for the
black tuberculosis hospital in Towson, in the Northwest section of the city. Towson
residents filed a court injunction against the tuberculosis commission because they did
not want the black hospital in their area. However, before the court ruled, the owners
sold the proposed property to Black and Decker at a lower price than the state offered,
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keeping the hospital out of the area.279
Segregated medical care for influenza, like tuberculosis, negatively influenced
patient survival rates. Fear of contagion continued to reinforce segregation along income
and ethnic lines, increasing tension in the city. Racial tensions also grew with the false
reports that blacks suffered fewer influenza infections than whites did. Reports in the
black Afro-American newspaper stated that influenza death rates reported from the black
community remained consistently lower than white death rates. On October 11, 1918, the
health department reported 19 black of 36 deaths total in Baltimore for the day, proving
that the black community held no immunity to the disease.280 Still, newspaper reports
mislead citizens. One claimed that “there have been many deaths among the whites and
few among the colored.”281 An editorial by William Pickens of Baltimore related a
Charleston, West Virginia post office patron’s belief that “God must be a n**ger because
the influenza germ was partial to black people.” Mr. Pickens wrote that that neither the
flu germ, nor any other germ, chose victims because of color, as germs look only for
opportunity. He was right. While white people suffered more influenza infections in the
early days of the epidemic, black people developed more fatal pneumonia complications
than whites. Whenever blacks died faster in any disease process, some whites credited
black inferiority, but when the notion that influenza did not attack blacks as often as
whites began to spread, white commenters began to say that black people were not
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“really” human.282
Reports that blacks did not suffer from influenza as much as whites possibly
reduced panic in the black community, but records of the Baltimore Health Department
nevertheless indicate that a reason for panic was still there. An Afro-American
newspaper examination of Health Department Records from 1901 to 1926 demonstrated
that blacks in Baltimore died at about twice the rate as whites during 1918. During the
influenza epidemic, the death rate for blacks was 41.5 deaths per 1000 in population,
higher than it had been in the fifty years prior to the epidemic, and much higher than the
24 per 1000 death rate of white Baltimore residents for the same period.283 The article
explained the significance of charts graphically noting the rise and fall of death rates in
the races, noting that each race tracked similarly to the other. When conditions present in
either race caused a rise or fall in mortality for one group, it caused the same rise or fall
in the other group. Smallpox, like tuberculosis and influenza, also attacked blacks and
frightened Baltimore’s white population because black citizens frequently worked in
white homes. A man who worked as a butler for a family in Baltimore County developed
smallpox. He came from a North Carolina area with a low vaccination rate, so the Health
Department immediately vaccinated anyone he contacted and put him in quarantine to
prevent spread of the disease.284 The newspaper report declined to mention if the white
family he contacted also served a quarantine period.
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Baltimore was one of ten cities that the U.S. Public Health Service canvassed
door to door after the fall pandemic wave. The USPHS compiled data during and after
the pandemic on influenza and pneumonia infections, deaths, along with sex, age, and
race, and it studied possible relationships between death rate and family economic
condition. The health service also performed a second survey in January 1919 in
Baltimore and San Francisco to see if the data remained consistent.285 Baltimore reported
an influenza and related pneumonia death rate comparable to, or sometimes higher than
other large cities during the epidemic. From September 14, 1918 to March 1, 1919,
Baltimore’s death rate from influenza and pneumonia was 7.4 per 1000 of population,
higher than New York City, including 1956 influenza deaths and 3006 from pneumonia.
The health department tracked the extent that influenza and pneumonia increased the
normal death rate during the epidemic, classifying Baltimore’s excess death rate as 6.1
per 1000, one of the highest for larger cities. The study did not differentiate between
death rates for citizens of different races.286
In Baltimore, black influenza patients had few places to go for care and fewer
medical professionals to provide it. Prior to the Civil War, white and free black citizens
proposed black hospitals where black physicians could practice and black women could
learn nursing.287 Black hospitals developed as a continuation of colonial almshouses to

Rollo H. Britten, “The Incidence of Epidemic Influenza, 1918-19: A Further Analysis
According to Age, Sex, and Color of the Records of Morbidity and Mortality Obtained in Surveys
of 12 Localities,” Public Health Reports (1896-1970) 47, no. 6 (February 5, 1932): 303-39.
285

286

“City ‘Flu’ Total 1,956,” The Sun, March 9, 1919.

Vanessa N. Gamble, The Black Community Hospital: Contemporary Dilemmas in
Historical Perspective (New York: Garland Publishing, 1989), 8.
287

95

provide training for the increasing number of medical schools in the country.288 Few of
these white established segregated facilities survived reconstruction with the exception of
the Howard University Hospital, formerly the Freedmen’s Hospital in Washington, DC,
and the Meharry Medical College Hospital in Memphis.289
By the end of the nineteenth century, more hospitals specifically for black
medical patients began to appear. These medical facilities fell into several categories:
Some whites established segregated facilities to serve black patients, while some blacks
established black hospitals like Provident Hospital in Baltimore to train and provide
clinical practice for black physicians and nurses. Some hospitals served the race
demographically determined by the population surrounding the hospital. In many cases,
these demographically determined black hospitals were neither black founded nor
established to serve black people. Instead, they evolved into black hospitals because of
the surrounding black population.290 White people founded facilities to provide medical
care in the black community for many reasons. Some whites, motivated by paternalism,
genuinely desired to care for black people. Others embraced germ theory, believing that
by treating sick black people, especially those working as domestics for white families,
they might protect white health. Still other whites built black hospitals to avoid
embarrassment for completely neglecting the sick in the black community. Regardless of
motivation, white citizens, health care workers, and patients did not want black sick in
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the same hospitals as whites.291 As in Baltimore, a few hospitals, particularly in the
North, maintained separate wards or wings for black patients, but the conditions were
certainly not equal.292
Prior to the twentieth century, black families usually cared for sick relatives at
home. The few nineteenth century hospitals treating blacks functioned as welfare
institutions housing indigents along with sick people.293 Despite these rare institutions,
most blacks had no access to care facilities at all, even when they existed for white
citizens. For example, an in-patient care facility for “feeble minded” white children was
established in 1888 in the rural county town of Owings Mills called the Rosewood
Training School. This facility housed white children from Baltimore City and county.
No facility existed for black children facing the same challenges. Bayview Hospital
housed a few severely developmentally challenged black children in the segregated ward
that also treated infectious tuberculosis patients; otherwise, black children with
developmental problems received care only at home.294
In Baltimore, most hospitals did not accept black patients at all, but a few white
hospitals did serve black sick in separate wards or wings away from their white patients.
Segregated facilities clearly treated black patients as second-class. In the general
hospitals, City Hospital (later renamed Mercy) had a poorly ventilated railroad ward and
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a completely unventilated immigrant ward. This hospital housed black patients in an
older building considered inferior to those other two inferior wards. The Southern
Homeopathic Medical College and Hospital of Baltimore, which closed in 1910 before
the pandemic, housed black patients in a “slightly” remodeled stable. The Catholic Saint
Agnes Hospital accepted white patients only, while Johns Hopkins and Bay View
hospitals supposedly treated white and black equally, but many considered the care at
these facilities poor for everyone.295
Black physicians desired an all-black medical facility since white hospitals did
not permit black physicians and nurses to practice there, even in the black wards.
Further, white medical associations did not allow black doctors to become members, nor
did the white journals publish studies and papers by black scientists and doctors.
Exclusion from white medical associations and journals caused black doctors to create
their own medical association to share information and research, called the National
Medical Association. Physicians of the National Medical Association published their
findings and studies in the Journal of the National Medical Association.296
The first black hospital in Baltimore, Provident Hospital of Baltimore, began in
1894 as a clinic of only ten beds housed in a small private home. Most of its founders
were black Baltimore physicians who composed the medical staff and the hospital board
of trustees. The hospital quickly ran out of space because of its success, so it moved into
a larger private dwelling in downtown Baltimore eighteen months later. The hospital
struggled to create enough income to maintain the facility, receiving limited financial
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support from patients and little contribution from city and state governments. The small
group of founding physicians often provided financial support from their own pockets to
keep the hospital open and able to provide care to Baltimore’s black population.297
During the 1918-19 pandemic, the medical staff and board of directors kept
Provident Hospital open, although they encountered constant fund raising difficulties.
Due to the number of black influenza and pneumonia patients seeking care, the hospital
was more crowded than ever before. Provident Hospital remained at full capacity during
the entire pandemic. The hospital had forty beds, but needed double that number. The
administration reluctantly refused requests from the Red Cross and City Charities to serve
more patients because it lacked the room. The superintendent hospital physician worked
day and night to care for patients and employed extra nurses during the epidemic.298
Provident hospital and the few white hospitals with black wards never kept up
with the needs of black citizens during the influenza pandemic. While Baltimore did not
provide a flu hospital for blacks, in nearby Washington, the public health service did. It
also opened a separate emergency station at the Armstrong Manual Training School to
handle black patients exclusively. Black doctors, nurses, and volunteer helpers made up
the facility staff. The public health service furnished all supplies and equipment to both
the black flu hospital and emergency station. Public health authorities in Washington
believed that many black people failed to report needy cases to authorities, so this care
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station reached out to those needy sick.299
Black citizens suffered from a shortage of black doctors and nurses. In Baltimore,
blacks desiring medical training prior to the pandemic had few schools open to them,
decreasing the number of trained black physicians available during the epidemic and for
subsequent complicating conditions. One school that did provide this training was the
Medico, Chirurgical and Theological College on North Ensor Street, which began
training black doctors and nurses in Baltimore in 1900. Led by a black college president,
this school also conducted college level training in theology.300 Many of the doctors
trained at this school went on to treat patients at Provident hospital, Bayview hospital,
and in the few wards in white hospitals allotted to black patients. Howard University in
nearby Washington also operated a physician training school for black students, at the
time it was the only black medical school to receive federal financial help. An ad in the
Afro-American noted that Howard was aided by the government and would pay a “boy’s
board, lodging, clothing, and pay him one dollar a day while getting his education.”
Howard maintained schools of Theology, Medicine, Dentistry and Pharmacy, all open to
blacks. In the school year of 1917-1918, Howard University had 1500 students and a
faculty of one hundred.301
Not surprisingly, white Baltimoreans normally did not seek care from black
physicians. In fact, this situation was so rare that the Afro-American newspaper
published an article about a white man treated by a black physician. Appearing to be an
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advertisement, Thomas Ween said he tried various doctors and hospitals, but only found
relief after treatment by Dr. Campbell. Readers, however, never learned the nature of
Mr. Ween’s medical condition. Ween further praised Dr. Campbell, writing that he
experienced such good results that he referred other family members to the doctor.
Ween’s family also experienced with positive results with the treatment.302 Mr. Ween’s
treatment by a black physician was not a commonplace occurrence. However, an article
written after the pandemic noted some progress in black physicians’ opportunities to treat
white citizens. According to the article, authorities called a black doctor out of bed after
a streetcar crash in Baltimore. Fourteen whites lined up for treatment along with two
black women, a significant enough event to merit mention in the newspaper. The doctor,
Dr. Fisher, spent an hour dressing and stitching the lacerations and bruises of those hurt,
both black and white.303
Prejudice also caused black nursing shortages during the pandemic. White
facilities prohibited the hiring of black nurses, even banning them from working in the
black wards in white hospitals. Only black hospitals trained or allowed black nurses to
work there. Black women had to obtain their training at black nursing schools since
white schools overwhelmingly prohibited their admission. Even after black nurses
graduated from nursing school and became “graduate nurses,” they could not take the
registered nursing board exams required to apply for nursing positions in white hospitals.
Since training programs for black nurses remained rare, the Provident Hospital of
Baltimore became a nurse training facility, producing graduate nurses in limited numbers.
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Provident built student nurse accommodations complete with a medical library in the
hospital building.304
The American Red Cross even excluded black nurses from helping with civilian
and military patients until late in WWI, adding to severe nurse shortages during the
pandemic. The American Red Cross supplied nurses to the military, organized nursing
care for civilians during the influenza pandemic, and helped with other public health and
welfare related tasks. The secretary of Howard University wrote to the Washington Post
to advocate that the Red Cross organize a unit of colored nurses, citing that the Red Cross
denied applications of experienced and trained nurses who wished to help in the war
effort because of their color. Mr. Cook argued that the war effort required as many
nurses as possible and that black nurses would provide “unselfish and patriotic devotion
to the nation.”305
By the height of the pandemic, the American Red Cross changed its stance. In the
fall of 1918, the Red Cross allowed black women to volunteer as nursing aid workers to
help with black civilian patients. The Red Cross Civilian Relief Department comprised
both black and white nurses and volunteers who took turns relieving each other in the
homes of citizens of either color who applied to the Relief Department for aid. The
agency called for civilian volunteers to help, noting that Red Cross nurses encountered
entire households sick with influenza or pneumonia. The Red Cross asked anyone that
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could help to volunteer, even if they could spare only a few hours a day. It printed
appeals in the Afro-American newspaper for women in the black community with any
amount of training to help with the sick. Acceptable training included hospital
experience and nursing experience gained tending to the sick at home. Mrs. Mitchell, the
black graduate nurse in charge of the program, assigned clients to women accepted to
work as “nurse’s aides.”
The Red Cross published a similar newspaper appeal in The Sun asking volunteers
to help with the white community’s sick. This article asked for nurses, nurses’ aides, and
visiting health care volunteers to work with the Baltimore Red Cross chapter. Unlike
programs for the black community, the Instructive Visiting Nurse Association, Federated
Charities, and other charitable organizations joined the Red Cross in the white
community efforts. The Red Cross also requested autos for a couple of hours a day to
help black nurses and aides to reach needy patients in the community.306 Though the
agency accepted both white and black volunteers, it maintained separate and segregated
offices and branches where the women of each race went to volunteer. The white
headquarters was at Druid Hill and Eutaw Streets, while the Colored Branch was located
further away on Druid Hill Avenue.307
The Red Cross would not consider black patients who had available help from
family members for volunteer services, and it cautioned the black public not to ask for
help in any but the most serious situations. The Red Cross intended to serve only the
black sick who had no help or did not know how to help themselves. However, The Sun,
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serving the white community, quoted a Red Cross promise that nurses would visit
everyone asking for care. Unlike the article in the Afro-American black newspaper, this
article did not caution readers not to call except in dire situations.308
Deep racial tensions permeated every aspect of Baltimore city health care, even
that of schoolchildren. The Health Commissioner for Baltimore schools appointed a staff
of black physicians and nurses for medical inspections in the black public schools.
Commissioner Jones said that black medical personnel would help with the physical
improvement of Negro children in the city by instructing the children in public health and
sanitary practices. He also stated that since about one-sixth of the population of
Baltimore was black, black children’s health would be important to the general health in
the city as the children grew to adulthood. However, Jones wanted these black doctors
and nurses to work without pay for the remainder of the 1919-1920 school year, saying
that the department lacked funds to pay them. He promised to ask the legislature to fund
black salaries for the following school year.309 White doctors and nurses in the white
public schools, on the other hand, received pay for their work that school year and in later
years. By 1920, the Baltimore City Health Department employed nurses for each public
school. White schools employed and paid registered nurses while black nurses working
in black schools worked entirely as volunteers. Black nurses received no pay, and
remained ineligible for permanent positions until they passed the registered nurse
examination, even if they graduated from nursing programs in the city. Further
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discriminating against them, regulations prohibited black nurses from taking the required
registered nurse board examinations necessary before applying for paid positions even
though they already worked in the schools as professional nurses without pay.310
Despite black graduate nurses earning nothing for their work with the school
board and public health agencies, a citizen writing an editorial in the Sun expressed his
disgust that not all black nurses in the public health system were graduate nurses like
white nurses. Public Health Department nurse requirements stated that all nurses
graduate a nursing program and be registered nurses (RNs) licensed in the State of
Maryland.311 The writer obviously did not realize that racial discrimination made it
impossible for black nurses to sit for the state RN exam, or that all black nurses working
in the schools graduated from a nursing program.
Baltimore health department records demonstrate that blacks died from all causes
at a rate nearly double of the white city residents. The annual black mortality rate from
all causes for the preceding year of 1916 per 1000 in population was 33.96% compared to
the death rate for the white population of 16.91% for the same period. At this time, the
city estimated the Negro population at 90,000 people.312 Doctors listed medical
conditions like consumption, pneumonia, and heart disease on death certificates, but other
factors caused death indirectly. Poorly ventilated, over-crowded, and unsanitary
dwellings housing blacks played a large part in allowing disease to take hold, and killed
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many middle-of-life blacks. Crowded working conditions in industries employing black
men also promoted disease. Additionally, some black mothers endangered themselves
and their unborn children by working to augment family income. While some poor
blacks were ignorant of hygiene, others remained unable to take hygienic measures due to
living conditions and poverty even with knowledge. Despite Baltimore’s reputation for
excellent health and hospital facilities, poor living conditions, poverty, and their color
prohibited most black citizens using white medical facilities for care.313
In a report written by health commissioner Blake in 1918, five black Baltimoreans
died for every three born. The black community blamed the city administration including
Mayor Preston for the high death rate. The administration did nothing to address the
unsanitary conditions in colored sections of the city, leaving streets and alleys unpaved,
public dining places unsanitary, and theaters unventilated. Additionally, insufficient
hospital and nursing facilities existed to serve black areas, and officials did not enforce
compulsory school laws in the segregated community. However, the administration
spent money completing the municipal waterfront and sunken gardens in the white
section, along with other improvements to make the white parts of the city more
beautiful.314 Black citizens generally could not and did not use improvements made to
white sections so the money spent did not benefit them. Rather, sanitary improvements
would likely have cut the black sickness and death rate during the epidemic and
afterward.
When the local health bureau studied high black mortality in Baltimore, the
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resulting report noted that the death rate of black citizens reached a peak in 1918 from the
influenza pandemic and associated conditions such as pneumonia. The death rate for
blacks of all ages exceeded the death rate of whites up to the age of sixty-five. The
excessive death rate of blacks compared to whites in Baltimore also existed at
approximately the same rate in other cities. The report noted that tuberculosis caused a
large portion of black deaths in Baltimore. The city had the power to decrease the death
toll by undertaking anti-tuberculosis measures. The report listed cancer as the only
disease in which the colored death rate was lower than for whites. For most health
conditions, the increased death rate of blacks came from poor living conditions that the
black community could not remedy themselves. Black citizens had to wait for property
owners to build better housing, for the city to drain the streets in their neighborhoods, and
for the government to open up thoroughfares through crowded settlement areas in order
to improve their communities. The Afro-American newspaper noted that the problems
blacks experienced existed citywide, and all agencies, black and white, needed to
cooperate to improve health conditions.315 Unfortunately, most needed reforms and
improvements did not happen until well after the pandemic.
In a study published in 1931, the Public Health Service verified that the popular
misconception that the influenza epidemic hit rich and poor people alike was simply not
true. Although the epidemic devastated all people in all classes, detailed studies
indicated that the lower the economic level, the more likely the person would suffer
influenza infection and death from complicating conditions. This relationship between
economic level and infection rate persisted even after adjusting for the color, sex, and age
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of those people studied.316 Health care proved far from equal as racial and medical
stereotyping and segregation caused black deaths. White citizens restricted black access
to health care professionals and facilities, limited black access to medical education
which limited the number of black doctors and nurses available to treat black citizens,
and did not undertake sanitary and health measures in substandard housing found in black
districts.

316

“’Flu’ of 1918-19 Hit Poor More than Rich,” The Washington Post, February 23, 1931.
108

CHAPTER VII

SEGREGATION IN AN UNEQUAL MILITARY

Infectious disease nearly always seems to accompany military conflict. In World
War I, influenza helped put an end to a German offensive in June 1918, as nearly half a
million German soldiers fell ill. These soldiers suffered poor diets and conditions,
causing their resistance and ability to fight off the infection to be lower than that of their
allied enemies.317 Most modern medical historians agree that military conditions
worldwide during WWI led to the quick spread and unusual fatality rate of the 1918-19
influenza pandemic.318 Wars brought novel microbes and young soldiers from many
different places together, infecting new enlistees with germs not usually found in their
home areas and allowing them to spread the germs through military training camps and
then to war zones.319 A study published in The Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences argued there existed nothing sinister about the 1918 virus, though it infected a
third of all people on earth and caused an estimated 50 million deaths. Instead bad timing
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and luck took the blame.320 Wartime travel brought people and needed materials to and
from the European war zone, while expanding rail systems in America and beyond
accelerated transmission throughout the world.321 The Great War caused bad timing and
luck, but neither accounted for higher black influenza and complication mortality rates in
the military. The higher mortality for black soldiers resulted from segregated,
overcrowded, and substandard housing, from assignment to labor battalions with hard
physical labor, and from shortages of food, clothing and sleep. Additionally, a general
shortage of medical care and the lack of black soldiers’ equal access to physicians,
nurses, and health care contributed to a higher black infection and death rate.
Even before the influenza pandemic, conditions in the military held potential to
encourage and spread disease. The Surgeon General of the Army, Major General
William C. Gorgas admitted that fighting men and their commanders knew the
importance of good health to the military. During WWI, European military bases set up
mobile labs, laundries, and delousing stations to rid soldiers and prisoners of war of the
louse-borne disease “trench fever,” which incapacitated over a million soldiers during the
war.322 General Gorgas said that military life always favored the spread of septic
pneumonia because large numbers of men came together in large numbers and crowded
into barracks of up to two hundred men each.
During the 1918 influenza pandemic, influenza and resulting pneumonia caused
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heavy death rates among all combatants. Historian Carol Byerly examined war
department records from World War I, particularly medical records and naval documents,
and demonstrated that wartime conditions in the camps, trenches and battlefields in
France allowed the pandemic virus pathogen to increase in virulence.323 The army death
rate during the pandemic was approximately five times that of the civilian population of
New York City. General Gorgas admitted that conditions on troop transports added to
the influenza pandemic; each ship suffered about seventy pneumonia deaths and about
three-hundred cases of influenza. Overcrowding at military installations remained a
concern, and the Surgeon General reasoned that putting soldiers into smaller huts of six
men or less rather than in large barracks could cut infection rates in units.324 Americans
back home became alarmed over the poor health conditions in military camps and
advocated congressional attention to the situation. In doing so, they pushed the War
Department to make reforms.325 Despite calls for change, the war ended before positive
reforms materialized.
The influenza pandemic prevented filling quotas for enlisted men going to
training, as the widespread disease delayed medical boards from examining new
volunteers and draftees. By November after the worst of the epidemic passed, local draft
boards found themselves inundated with men unable to reach the medical examiners
during September and October. Draft boards delayed examining and inducting some
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registrants from September 12 and later until November, despite medical officers
examining three hundred men a day in the interim to try to clear the backlog.326
Once accepted for the service, the military rarely treated black soldiers the same
as white ones. A study of army rations issued in training camps Grant, Dodge, and
Funston over four months indicates that troops of the 366th Infantry Unit of the all-black
92nd Division received less protein and fewer calories than white infantrymen. This
practice continued despite the fact that the black troops were taller and heavier on
average than white troops and thus required more protein and calories to remain healthy
and strong.327 Neither blacks nor whites likely realized the difference in rations because
they were either assigned to separate camps or separate areas within larger camps.
There were several military camps in the Baltimore area during WWI; Camp
Meade being the largest. From these Baltimore area camps, soldiers formed units who
then dispersed to other camps. The first of these, the First Separate Company from
Baltimore went with the Separate Battalion from the District of Columbia to Camp
McClellan in Alabama. The Army used the term “separate” to designate black units.
The troops staged at Camp McClellan were among the first to ship out to France.328
Military camps became major centers of influenza spread, especially those camps
housing new recruits. Recent arrivals to military training camps got sick in higher
numbers than did men of similar age who had served longer. During the war, soldiers in
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service less than four months made up sixty percent of all military influenza and related
pneumonia deaths.329 Historian Alfred Crosby explained that an important factor in flu
transmission in both military camps and civilian cities was overcrowding, and military
camps were greatly overcrowded.330 By December of 1918, the Public Health Service
estimated that there were at least 20,000 deaths in army camps in the United States alone
from the influenza epidemic.331 Historian Richard Collier wrote of the pandemic’s social
impact relative to poor military conditions, focusing on hunger, overcrowding, and lack
of running water and sewage facilities that became more significant as the war stretched
resources.332
Camp Devans near Boston, suffered the highest loss of life of all military camps
in the fall influenza wave. Because of transmission from soldiers and civilians working
at the camp, the disease quickly spread to nearby communities. Camp Meade near
Baltimore also suffered with influenza sickness and death, reporting five hundred new
cases of influenza on a single day in September of 1918.333 By October 5, the virus was
spreading rapidly in military camps throughout the country, with nearly thirteen thousand
new cases reported just among the soldiers in training. Many influenza sufferers
developed complicating pneumonia that significantly decreased the patient’s likelihood
of recovery. The army reported that pneumonia cases nationwide nearly doubled in just
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one day from nine-hundred thirty on October 4 to 1854 on the fifth. The military
reported that public health officials and the Red Cross were working together in civilian
cities and army camps to help decrease the number of new cases.334 Just over the MasonDixon line, the small Camp Colt in Gettysburg, Pennsylvania even reported eleven deaths
in one day, with twenty one new cases reported between October fourth and fifth.335
Camp Meade reported hundreds of new influenza cases and many deaths on the same
days, including six young men from Baltimore.336
In her work on military aspects of the pandemic, Byerly argued that black soldiers
had lower morbidity but higher mortality than white soldiers. Some army reports
credited the blacks’ higher mortality to racial weakness and susceptibility to illness.
Nevertheless, racially segregated housing in army camps might actually have kept some
black units from initial influenza infection and thus lowered morbidity rates, but inferior
living conditions, lack of access to and poor medical care would account for their higher
mortality. For example, the soldiers of the 803rd Pioneers, a black unit, had only one
medical officer to care for several hundred sick men in the regiment.337
Local black units in the Baltimore area included those assigned to Camp Holabird
on the eastern bay-view side of the city. After diagnosing several cases of influenza in
the fall of 1918, commanding officers quarantined the entire camp. This “strict
quarantine” applied to the thousand or so black soldiers there, though the white officers
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were exempt from quarantine regulations.338 These officers were able to go and come
from the camp as they deemed necessary, bringing influenza virus microbes with them as
they went.
Nearby Camp Meade housed the 408th Labor Battalion, made up entirely of black
soldiers. These men did all the hard manual work necessary at the large military
installation; the unit’s training did not include any military tactics other than learning
“squads left” and “squads right” because the army never intended it deploy to the war
zone.339 Camp Meade also housed other units composed of white soldiers training for
combat. During flu quarantines in the fall of 1918, blocks in the camp containing black
soldiers stayed closed for four weeks, even after the military lifted the quarantine for
white soldiers. Visitors then could come on base and see the local white troops, yet the
military allowed no black soldiers visitors or furloughs. Era black newspapers reacted
with surprise that so few colored soldiers became sick or died from influenza, noting that
deaths of black soldiers numbered only about two dozen during the quarantine.340 Public
Health reports issued well after the pandemic passed revealed the incidence of respiratory
diseases reported in Army hospital admissions as per 1000 was 310.4. The comparable
rate per 1000 for the city of Baltimore was 246.341 No data disclosed military influenza
infection rates by race.
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All soldiers, regardless of race, suffered because of widespread physician and
nurse shortages in the military, especially overseas. Substandard care resulted in great
measure from the refusal of the military to utilize black doctors and nurses despite their
desire to serve. In June 1917, the War Department stated that it required two hundred
black physicians to accompany the colored troops to Europe. However, the War
Department did not commission those black doctors until 1918, after the influenza
pandemic sickened and killed many soldiers and even doctors. The army also did not
commission any black surgeons despite need, and some of those commissioned in 1917
and 1918 did not receive appointments to units. Britain lost so many physicians by 1917
that a British Colonel urged the Americans to push the social bar aside and accept black
doctors.342
Even after the military permitted them a commission, it allowed neither black
dentists nor black doctors to serve in white regiments, despite a great need for medical
personnel in all units. Additionally, the medical corps commonly did not utilize black
medical personnel to treat the black regiments. In 1918 at the height of American troop
strength in France, the military commissioned one-hundred twenty black dentists but left
them back in the states on the medical personnel inactive list while white dentists treated
black soldiers when available. The Department of the Army, queried about the practice
of commissioning and making available black doctors ready to serve and then not using
them, said that the “Department does not find it practicable to have colored dental
officers and white officers of the line in the same regiment.” Additionally, drafted black
physicians, including a Baltimore Doctor, Dr. Boley, received assignments to regular
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units along with other non-medical degreed draftees even though a severe shortage of
doctors existed in military camps at home and in Europe.343
Shortages of doctors and dentists plagued the military throughout the war,
especially during the worst of the pandemic. Nursing care remained the most effective
treatment for the pandemic flu, however a preventable but critical nursing shortage also
existed during the war. In May 1918, New York City hosted a large patriotic meeting in
which an influential black group launched a movement to get black nurses to France to
nurse the sick and wounded troops. The chair of the meeting, George Battle, who was
white, said that the American Red Cross continually “passed the buck” to the war
department when black nurses asked to go to the European front. Mr. Battle noted that
trained nurses ready and willing to go to the front could not help the troops, only because
of their race. He called for a Universal Red Cross rather than a black Red Cross and a
white Red Cross.344 Similarly, a citizen writing an editorial to the Washington Post
echoed the sentiment that the Red Cross should accept black nurses fully in their nursing
organization. The writer, Mr. Cook, argued that colored nurses in the United States fully
qualified by “nature and training to meet the call for loyalty, teamwork, and
professionalism.”345 These pleas went to the American Red Cross because the
organization remained in charge of supplying nurses to the military during the entire war.
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The Red Cross undertook a major recruitment campaign in 1917 looking for more nurses
for the Armed Forces Nurse Corps, an arm of the military that the organization managed.
No regulations specifically banned black nurses, but the military required that nurse
applicants graduate from a school associated with a hospital of fifty beds or more. This
effectively eliminated most black nurses because they graduated from segregated hospital
training schools with fewer than the required fifty beds as white facilities with more beds
rarely accepted black nursing students. As a result, both military and civilian hospitals
experienced serious nurse shortages by the time of the pandemic, when flu patients
overwhelmed hospital facilities.346
In 1918, the Colored Nurses’ Convention held in nearby Washington DC pointed
out that over two thousand professional nurses wanted to provide their service to the
army. The Colored Nurse group asked Surgeon General Gorgas on May 27, 1918 to state
the real reason that he did not allow the black nurses to serve. Gorgas cited the lack of
housing facilities, as white nurses refused housing with blacks. Some black nurses saw
his response as a disingenuous attempt to use white nurses as a foil for the Army's own
institutionalized racism.347 Over three hundred black women managed to get to France to
serve as military nurses during the war; however, these light-skinned black women went
as whites. Reports at the time claimed that the military never knowingly accepted black
nurses to serve in France.348 At the time of the nurse convention, the military continued
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to reject black nurses despite the loss of nurses to flu and pneumonia during the
pandemic, the high sickness rate among troops from the disease, wartime injuries and
other sickness, and the high overall need for nurses throughout the war.
During the pandemic, medical personnel frequently got sick from exposure to
infectious troops. After eleven of eighty-one medical officers fell ill, and three civilian
and three Army nurses died at Camp Grant in Illinois, the Army Medical Department
finally dropped its total prohibition of black nurses. This action allowed Camp Grant to
allow black nurses to help care for the many influenza patients there. The black nurses,
however, had to wait until the camp built separate, segregated housing for them, causing
a delay in getting much needed nursing care to the stricken soldiers.349 The arm sent
another group of black nurses finally allowed to serve to Camp Sherman in Ohio. There,
black nurses cared for both black and white patients, yet the army required their
assignment to segregated living quarters. Some of the black nurses fell ill from the
pandemic and many died. In total, one hundred twenty-seven total Army nurses died in
the pandemic. The military did not record mortality statistics by race.350
After returning home, many wounded veterans still required nursing and hospital
care. The U.S. Army constructed General Hospital No. 2 at Fort McHenry in Baltimore
for that purpose. The Fort McHenry hospital complex began in August 1917 with fewer
than twenty buildings and grew to over one hundredby the end of 1919. The hospital
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accommodated about 3500 patients at its peak.351 The American Red Cross, YMCA,
Salvation Army, and others joined with the Army to help these wounded men, dealing
with many injuries and incorporating job and life-skills training.352 Supplying additional
help for disabled veterans, the Red Cross created a facility in North Baltimore for blind
soldiers where they learned woodworking, poultry farming, and received musical
training. Though unusual for the time, photographs preserved at the Maryland Historical
Society give evidence of racial integration at the facility. Hospital No. 2 at Fort
McHenry also served black soldiers, though there is little mention of them even in
Baltimore’s Afro-American newspaper.353
Drives for private hospitals to serve black war wounded began in numerous cities
toward the end of the war. Dr. William A. Sinclair directed the New York hospital drive,
which he viewed as a great opportunity for black physicians to assist in caring for
returning soldiers of their own race. He further maintained that black troops proved their
bravery and work ethic as good soldiers in battle and demonstrated themselves as good
citizens and law-abiding men while stationed at camps throughout the country.354
Philadelphia also launched a drive to fund a hospital for black war wounded. The
hospital planned to use funds raised to purchase, equip, and maintain a base hospital and
convalescent home staffed with black physicians and nurses. The drive’s slogan was
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“help Negro help his own,” in an attempt to draw in white benefactors and to presumably
appeal to those who wished to keep the black and white war wounded separate.
Maryland Governor Harrington presided over the first mass fund-raising meeting for the
Philadelphia hospital committee.355
A hospital specifically for Baltimore or Maryland black war wounded never
materialized, perhaps because the Fort McHenry hospital accepted black patients.
Though separate facilities never provided equal care, lack of access to even inferior
facilities forced families of black soldiers to provide care for their injured returning
family member, often with limited economic means. Other soldiers returned to Baltimore
without families to go home to as the pandemic caused so much death and disruption.
The overcrowded Baltimore alley districts many black soldiers left prior to the fall
pandemic wave in 1918 often bore little resemblance to the areas to which they returned.
Segregated conditions in the military, like segregated conditions in the civilian city,
negatively affected the lives of black citizens. Higher influenza and related pneumonia
infection and mortality for blacks resulted from segregated, overcrowded, and
substandard housing, having less food and clothing than supplied to whites, and
assignment to labor battalions with hard physical labor and shortages of food, clothing,
and sleep. These issues all affected the black soldiers’ likelihood of infection.
Additionally, shortages of physicians in the military, in part because of the exclusion of
black doctors and nurses, and lack of black soldiers’ equal access to physicians, nurses,
and health care contributed to a higher black infection and death rate.
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CHAPTER XIII

CONCLUSION: LESSONS LEARNED?

Heath Department statistics compiled after the pandemic proved that poverty,
crowding, poor living conditions, and lack of equal access to medical professionals and
facilities inherent in segregated communities increased infection and mortality rates
during the influenza pandemic of 1918 and 1919. Yet the black community of Baltimore
heralded the end of 1918 as a year of positive racial advances. Higher wages brought
prosperity to black and white war industry workers, and they passed along the windfall,
allowing their local churches to pay off much of their debt.
Many of the three-hundred-thousand black soldiers serving in the wartime
military thought they experienced racial progress during the war. Some black soldiers
felt that their bravery and hard work had broken racial prejudice. The Army even
reversed its earlier ban of black officers, training a thousand of them at Fort Des Moines
and other camps later in the war. At home, black citizens worked hard in Liberty Loan
activities, Red Cross Drives, and War Savings Stamps Campaigns. They worked
voluntarily but hoped their activities proved black patriotism despite the racial
inequalities and segregation they experienced. In industry, black riveters set the world
record for shipbuilding, black pile drivers won the record at Hog Island, Virginia, and
Detroit automakers employed 16,000 black workers in their shops and factories, up from
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a few hundred at the beginning of the war. Racial tensions eased, and progress seemed to
increase during the war and the worst times of the pandemic.356
Nevertheless, segregation, racial hatred, and discrimination in Baltimore did not
diminish, it just changed in strategy. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1917 that
neighborhood segregation was unconstitutional, efforts to maintain segregated
neighborhoods in Baltimore continued in the years after the pandemic. The state
government in Annapolis rejected some attempts of white citizens to get around the
repeal of segregation laws, but it did not stop all efforts to continue to segregate blacks,
whites, and in many cases, Jews. With legal residential segregation denied by the court,
whites formed neighborhood associations and corporations to resist black migration to
white areas. When blacks filed court cases to fight these racially discriminating groups,
white associations tended to prevail.357
Segregation remains a problem in Baltimore going into the twenty-first century.
In 2003, 14,000 black families living in public housing sued the Federal Government,
arguing that Baltimore worked to sustain segregation by building new public housing
right next to old structures thus keeping black tenants in the worst neighborhoods in the
city. A similar case in 1996 provided a partial settlement to tenants, awarding some of
them rental assistance vouchers that allowed them to move to surrounding suburban areas
with better schools. In the lawsuit, the city government noted that it already supplied
rental assistance vouchers to tenants in public housing. Further, replacing the older highrise buildings with low-density mixed-income communities caused a net loss to the

356

“A Review of the Year, 1918,” Afro-American, December 27, 1918.

357

“Injunction Forbids Negro to Move to White Block,” The Sun, November 23, 1920.
123

number of public assistance units, thus shrinking the size of the segregated areas and
allowing any citizens to move elsewhere if they chose to, black or white.358
Segregation traditionally affected immigrant groups as well as blacks, yet most
immigrants and their descendants assimilated and eventually moved from their enclaves
whereas blacks remained locked into segregated areas. Immigrant groups tend to
segregate themselves voluntarily because friends and family already live in specific areas,
yet blacks still face forced housing segregation because of external reasons including
violence, restrictive covenants, and racial steering by real estate agents. Immigrants
generally gain English fluency, become educated, and have the option to move out of the
immigrant neighborhood, but black residents in segregated neighborhoods rarely have
similar options to move.359
Like other states, Maryland made a few improvements to educational facilities for
blacks during 1918, establishing government classes in several larger schools such as
Tuskegee, nearby Howard University, and Hampton University. After the war, a number
of schools offered black students vocational training and college studies at government
expense. Maryland’s Governor Harrington promoted black education by opening black
public high schools outside Baltimore city to educate rural students. This action, while
positive in some ways, received many complaints because it overlooked the neglected
local black Baltimore schools in favor of opening new schools outside the city. Building
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rural schools also hurt city schools because city black teacher pay remained so low that
many qualified teachers refused to teach in black Baltimore schools.360
Baltimore did accomplish a few improvements in the area of cleanliness and
public health after the pandemic waned, especially in segregated black neighborhoods.
Health Commissioner C. Hampson Jones believed that the best way to influence public
health was to inspect public schools, particularly black schools, and he appointed a
number of black doctors and nurses for these medical inspections. Dr. Jones and the head
of public school health, Dr. Buckler, were some of the first white physicians to approve
black physicians and nurses for this work and for following up with the children in their
homes.361 In this way, though segregated, public health officials hoped to improve
conditions for black city schoolchildren.
Race relations in military installations in the Baltimore area did not markedly
improve in the years after the pandemic. After the war, about a hundred white soldiers
visiting Baltimore from Camp Meade started a potentially a serious race riot when they
accused a black resident of throwing a bottle out a window at a smaller group of Camp
Meade soldiers in East Baltimore. The large and growing mob dared the residents to
come out of their homes. Some of the group began shooting at any blacks they could find
in the neighborhood. Police responded to the shootings, resulting in a fight between the
police and the soldiers. In two separate brawls, the police arrested several soldiers while
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the others ran away and disappeared.362 This event among many illustrated that neither
the pandemic nor the war meaningfully improved racial tensions. Moreover, military
officials reversed the few race relations improvements they made prior to the war’s end
by reintroducing segregation in units and installations after the armistice. Additionally,
the military continued to require segregation of nurses up to the conclusion of World War
II, twenty-seven years later. The NAACP and a council of the National Alpha Kappa
Alpha Sorority pushed to include a clause in legislation ending discrimination and
segregation in the drafting of nurses for the military. 363
After the war, Veterans Administration medical director Dr. Paul R. Hawley
continued to defend his policy of racially segregating doctors and veterans in VA
hospitals. He stated that it remained better for their race that black doctors practiced only
in black hospitals. Dr. Hawley advocated that blacks practice at hospitals such as
Howard University and Meharry Medical College, and he added that black doctors could
either work in all black facilities or fall behind the white medical profession by
continuing to fight segregation. He further stated that he personally was opposed to the
mistreatment of black soldiers and wanted them to get them the medical excellence that
they deserved. Dr. Hawley acknowledged that black medical facilities, especially in the
South, lagged in quality behind those caring for white patients, but promised the black
hospitals would be “made adequate.”364 Dr. Hawley’s thinking proves that even as late as

362

“Camp Meade Men Attack Baltimore Negro Section,” The Washington Post, October

363

“NAACP, Council Wants Ban on Nurse Draft Segregation, Afro-American, January

3, 1919.
20, 1945.
364

“Hospital Segregation Upheld by VA Official,” Afro-American, April 6, 1946.
126

1946, racial segregation and discrimination practices continued to use old paternalistic
logic as validation that segregating black patients and doctors benefitted the entire race.
Unfortunately, medical care for black citizens did not improve in the years
following the pandemic. By 1973, less than five percent of medical students in the
country were black. Black dental and nursing students comprised only 4% of total
enrollments, despite conferences and efforts encouraging black youth to enter health care
careers. Many black students cited fear that they would not be able to handle the natural
sciences as reason for not entering the health fields. Teacher attitudes and experiences
instilled this fear in the students in the earlier grades. The shortage of black medical
personnel continues to affect health care in America. Additionally, medical research
studying conditions that affect the black community continue to receive less funding and
personnel than research into other diseases and problems. By the early 1970s, funding
for study of black hypertension remained at half of that allocated for the study of sickle
cell anemia, even though hypertension kills double the number of black citizens as sickle
cell. Most big medical school hospitals in Baltimore like Johns Hopkins and the
University of Maryland teaching hospital and Shock Trauma, were located in the middle
of or next to black neighborhoods, but they rarely treated black patients.365 Baltimore
continued to need more black doctors and nurses and more funding for medical schools
and facilities to treat blacks and research black health issues into the twentieth and then
twenty-first century. Though no longer mandated by residential segregation laws,
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overcrowded, poverty-stricken areas with high unemployment and substandard housing
still exist in many of Baltimore’s black neighborhoods.
Another large influenza outbreak would negatively affect the residents of these
areas because of their poor conditions, just as in the pandemic of 1918. Studies published
in leading medical and public health journals argue that an influenza pandemic similar to
the 1918-1919 outbreak would kill upwards of sixty-two million people, with more than
ninety-five percent of those deaths in third world countries. The WHO medical report
estimated that since per capita income is higher now worldwide there would be fewer
deaths on a percentage basis of world population than seen in 1918. This is because the
higher the income, the lower the risk of dying of influenza.366
The influenza pandemic of 1918-19, in conjunction with racial segregation and
unequal treatment of black citizens in housing, the military, and in health care access,
caused high infection and mortality in the black population of Baltimore. The very
segregation intended to keep blacks from infecting whites likely led to higher death rates
in both communities during the influenza pandemic. Neither disease nor health care
could be, nor can be, isolated, despite the artificial lines people draw around communities
or populations.
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Fox, William Lloyd. “Social-Cultural Developments from the Civil War to 1920.” In
Maryland A History: 1632-1974, ed. Richard Walsh and William Lloyd Fox, 499589. Baltimore: Maryland Historical Society, 1974.
Fox provides background information from a Maryland perspective. Baltimore
had a high rate of mortality from the Civil War to the turn of the century from
consumption, which was an important part of the Public Health program for Baltimore
going into the influenza pandemic.
Gamble, Vanessa N. The Black Community Hospital: Contemporary Dilemmas in
Historical Perspective. New York: Garland Publishing, 1989.
Gamble provides a good overview of the operations of black hospitals. Some
black hospitals in the south were established by whites while some hospitals like
Baltimore’s Provident Hospital were black controlled and established to train and provide
clinical opportunities for black physicians and nurses with a mandate to serve black
people. Most black establishments were inadequate with small facilities, ill equipped and
without clinical training programs.
Hays, J.N. Epidemics and Pandemics: Their Impacts on Human History. Santa Barbara:
ABC-Clio, Inc., 2005.
Hays’s work outlines the world’s most significant epidemics and pandemics,
looking at social interaction, the significance of the event in history, and how the event
was understood in its own era.
Hoehling, A. A. The Great Epidemic: When the Spanish Influenza Struck. Boston:
Little, Brown, and Company, 1961.
Hoehling’s work contained a narrative drawn from medical, public health, social,
and statistical records. Hoehling reported the early use of harmful flu remedies such as
tobacco juice, blood-letting, and purgatives, noting that impoverished victims sometimes
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recovered simply because they could not afford remedies that often hurt more than
helped. He dismissed era rumors of Germans spreading disease to turn the war, pointing
out that shortages of food, space, and sanitation endemic in wartime, especially in
military camps, were what spread influenza and other diseases. Germs traveling on troop
transports and fighter planes helped spread the epidemic quickly throughout the world.
Iezzoni, Lynette. Influenza 1918: The Worst Epidemic in American History. New York:
TV Books, LLC, 1999.
Iezzoni’s book included vignettes about individuals affected by the pandemic.
She wove memories of people about the event into her narrative, adding commentary
about people in variously sized communities throughout the country.
Kent, Susan Kingsley. The Influenza Pandemic of 1918-19: A Brief history With
Documents. Boston: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2013.
Kent argued that the extremely quick spread and high death rate in 1918 as a
product of the world war. The virus took advantage of people who were crowded into
military camps and hospitals, as they constantly had contact with new people. A virus
usually diminishes in infectiveness with lack of new hosts, but because of the war, new
hosts were always available.
Kolata, Gina. Flu: The Story of the Great Influenza Pandemic of 1918 and the Search
for the Virus that Caused It. 1999. Reprint, New York: Touchstone Books, 2005.
Kolata reported that doctors in 1918 provided elixirs and vaccines that were
ineffective because no one knew what caused the flu or how to treat it. Her work
outlined limitations to scientific inquiry at the time of the pandemic.
Laver, W.G., ed. The Origin of Pandemic Influenza Viruses: Proceedings of the
International Workshop on the Molecular Biology and Ecology of Influenza Virus
held in Peking, China, November 10-12, 1982. New York: Elsevier Science
Publishing, Inc., 1983.
This book functions as a compilation of articles relevant to pandemic influenza
viruses including the H1N1 swine flu virus associated with the 1918 pandemic. Articles
delve into the immune responses possibly responsible for the high young adult death rate
in 1918, and the role of cytotoxic T-cells examined by Shanks and Gagnon in articles
reviewed in this bibliography.
Leavitt, Judith Walzer, and Ronald L. Numbers, ed. Sickness and Health in America:
Readings in the History of Medicine and Public Health. 1978. Reprint, Madison:
University of Wisconsin Press, 1997.
This work is a collection of articles on medicine and public health first published
in 1978. Many of the articles examined germ theory, poor living conditions, and health
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of Americans. Influenza and pneumonia appeared in the overview as ever-present in
society, increasingly attacking crowded urban centers.
Markel, Howard. When Germs Travel: Six Major Epidemics that Have Invaded America
and the Fears They Have Unleashed. New York: Vintage Books, 2004.
Markel discusses how easy it is for infectious diseases to spread via the growing
and international transportation system. One of the six diseases he covers in detail is
tuberculosis, which was a significant cause of death in overcrowded black areas of
Baltimore even before the pandemic in 1918.
Oldstone, Michael B. A. Viruses, Plagues, and History: Past, Present, and Future.
New York: Oxford University Press, 2010.
Oldstone supplies some background information on the 1918 disease, discussing
mortality rates and the effect upon the war effort. He, like others before him, discussed
the fact that many young and seemingly healthy adults died from the disease, mentioning
that the disease seemed to be indiscriminate in the victims it chose. He compared the
infection and death rate for St. Louis and Philadelphia, noting that since Philadelphia
allowed public gatherings, kept schools and churches open, and allowed assemblies
including citywide Liberty Bond parades, it had twice the death rate of St. Louis. In stark
contrast to Philadelphia, St. Louis began to register influenza cases within two days of the
first cases, and their government closed schools, churches, theaters, and public
gatherings. St. Louis also required infected people to stay in their homes.
Olson, Karen. “Old West Baltimore: Segregation, African-American Culture, and the
Struggle for Equality.” In The Baltimore Book: New Views of Local History. Ed.
Elizabeth Fee, Linda Shopes, and Linda Zeidman, 57-79. Philadelphia: Temple
University Press, 1991.
The author examines the history of blacks in the old western neighborhoods and
alley districts and outlines the beginnings of segregation in the city during the Great
Migration. The author also examines the migration from the original black
neighborhoods to other neighborhoods to escape crowding and filth in the alley districts
in 1885. She points out that the frequently-polluted wells in South Baltimore led to a
significantly higher rate of epidemic disease than in other neighborhoods. She also
looked at racism in the city and era attitudes about minority groups.
Olson, Sherry H. Baltimore: The Building of an American City. Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1980.
This comprehensive history of Baltimore city includes portions about slums as
breeding grounds for disease, criminality, and disturbing elements. The period from
about 1900-1918 reveals Mayor Preston’s attitude toward blacks. He urged a close watch
on such “blotches” or “dark spots” like slums on the character of the city. Additionally,
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the book provides more information about tuberculosis infections blacks “deserved”
because of the filth that they lived in.
Patterson, K. David. Pandemic Influenza 1700-1900: A Study in Historical
Epidemiology. Totowa: Rowman and Littlefield, 1986.
This book contained information about the influenza pandemic of 1889-1890.
Transportation networks spread the 1889 pandemic, and doctors believed that it was an
infectious microorganism, perhaps Pfeiffer’s bacillus. Doctors and health officials kept
good data and statistics regarding spread and infection rate. The last major epidemic
before this was 1847-1848, yet many health officials did not recognize the 1889 epidemic
was from the same disease.
Pettit, Dorothy A., and Janice Bailie. A Cruel Wind: Pandemic Flu in America 19181920. Murfreesboro: Timberlane Books, 2008.
Petit and Bailie described the viral to bacterial interactions that made influenza
and pneumonia together nearly impossible to survive in 1918. They also added to the
few historical works that listed depression out of proportion to the severity of the disease
as a pandemic symptom. They also mentioned post recovery issues such as vascular and
nervous system damage, fatigue, psychosis, tachycardia, encephalitis, and related sudden
death.
Pietila, Antero. Not in My Neighborhood: How Bigotry Shaped a Great American City.
Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2010.
This book contains information about forced segregation in Baltimore. This work
explains the legislation and methods of segregating the black population from whites and
Jews in Baltimore city. The author talks about eugenics, Jim Crow laws, and living,
working, and transportation conditions in the city relative to segregation and the bigotry
that caused it. Antero also talks about the “lung block” of tuberculosis infection.
Porter, Katherine Anne. Pale Horse, Pale Rider. 1936. Reprint, Orlando: Harcourt
Brace and Company, 1967.
Author and newspaper reporter Porter wrote this work as a fictionalized yet
autobiographical story of the sufferings of an influenza victim. The work is important
because it outlined symptoms Porter suffered during her bout with the illness from a
personal perspective. Her narrative influenced later historical writers to offer more
descriptions of victims suffering rather than writing sterile recitations of numbers
infected and listing symptoms. Few other memoirs included information about the
depression suffered after recovery or mentioned the mental suffering that influenza
victims encountered while they were ill.
Pyle, Gerald F. The Diffusion of Influenza: Patterns and Paradigms. Lanham: Rowan
and Littlefield, Publishers, 1986.
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Pyle believed that a new era of interest in the pandemic began in the 1970s
because of worldwide pandemics of influenza in 1967-1968 and 1968-1969. Pyle
examined the disbursement of the infection throughout the country, using some of the
Public Health Reports but adding additional analysis and charts not reported in the era.
Roberts, Dorothy. Fatal Invention: How Science, Politics, and Big Business Re-create
Race in the Twenty-First Century. New York: The New Press, 2011.
Roberts covered many aspects of race in her work, including scientific and
sociological differences in the definition of race. Roberts argues that race is socially and
politically constructed, or in her words, “manufactured.” She discussed eugenics and the
disparities in health between black and white people in the United States, including
Baltimore in her chapter on medical stereotyping.
Roberts, Samuel Kelton, Jr. Infectious Fear: Politics, Disease, and the Health Effects of
Segregation. Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009.
This book contains a study of how the racial stereotyping, prejudice, and
segregation in Baltimore assisted the spread of tuberculosis. Before 1920 and during the
pandemic, white physicians, economists, and statisticians expressed mainly negative
views of the relation between race, urbanization, and tuberculosis. Many whites believed
that blacks’ desire to flee the rural agricultural work for the urban setting meant that they
were leaving the area where their Negro physiology and intellect was best suited, thus
tuberculosis was a result of blacks being where “they do not belong.”
Rosen, George. A History of Public Health. 1958. Reprint, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1993.
Though he does not specifically discuss influenza, Rosen does cover the bacterial
revolution and the idea that specific microorganisms cause contagious, epidemic disease.
He also discusses animal vectors, another concept involved in understanding the origin
and spread of the pandemic influenza microbe
Sewell, Jane Eliot. Medicine in Maryland: The Practice and the Profession, 1799-1999.
Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
This work covers medicine in Maryland with special attention paid to differences
in care in the diverse population of the state. Sewell covers medical institutions and
professionals who were important in the development of medicine. She covers the
defunct black Medical and Chirurgical Academy of Maryland, teaching hospitals, along
with medical theory pertinent to the epidemic. Sewell also covered changes in medical
thinking and teaching in the state since 1799.
Shilts, Randy. And The Band Played On: Politics, People, and the AIDS Epidemic.
New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987.
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This work contains information specific to the politicizing and stereotyping
occurring in the AIDS epidemic but also applicable to the influenza pandemic. Political
forces worked to quell fears in the public over influenza while public officials still tried
to keep the disease from spreading. Unfortunately, HIV also served to alienate and target
groups as causing and/or spreading the disease.
Starr, Paul. The Social Transformation of American Medicine. New York: Basic Books,
Inc., Publishers, 1982.
The work examined medical history, including how medicine and physicians
affected American society. He devoted a chapter to 1850-1930, covering the influenza
pandemic era, yet he wrote little about it. Starr championed physicians, writing that “he”
was sovereign, powerful, and threatened by the lay public’s desire to learn the contents of
drugs and the techniques of the physician. Thus, the public might no longer need doctors
and could even become competitors to medical professionals. Starr discussed stresses
and insecurities of physicians that could render them powerless to cure. Starr does not
mention the pandemic itself, likely because it was a time when doctors felt powerless
over disease and were powerless to cure. Starr continued to champion medical authority,
writing that medicine was the driving force behind the effectiveness of public health
measures against infectious diseases. Starr’s work illustrates the societal role physicians
played and thought they held during the pandemic.
Tomes, Nancy. The Gospel of Germs: Men, Women, and the Microbe in American Life.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998.
Tomes wrote about germ theory 1998. Tomes noted that to middle-class
Americans, poor, immigrant, and non-white people were associated with disease germs.
These stereotypes further resulted in class prejudice, nativism, and racism. But Tomes
also argued that some converts to germ theory believed in a “chain of disease” that linked
all Americans in society together, and worked to address the health problems of the poor,
minorities, and immigrants because their problems affected everyone. Tomes wrote that
during the pandemic, fear gripped the nation. Sick relatives and neighbors abandoned the
sick to die alone, owing to anxieties about contagion and escaping infection rooted in
widespread germ theory education. Since people did not know what caused the disease,
some were afraid they would catch it if they cared for the sick.
Zimmerman, Barry E., and David J. Zimmerman. Killer Germs: Microbes and Diseases
that Threaten Humanity. New York: McGraw Hill and Companies, 2003.
This work outlines historical accounts of infectious diseases from antiquity to the
present, explaining how the discovery of the microscope aided medical researchers to
learning about microbes and their role in disease. Pertinent to the study of influenza, the
chapter “Viruses that kill” covered the disease that killed perhaps forty million people in
1918-19.
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Articles
Almond, Douglas, and Bhashkar Mazumder. “The 1918 Influenza Pandemic and
Subsequent Health Outcomes: An Analysis of SIPP Data.” American Economic
Review 95, no. 2 (May 2005): 258-62.
This article looked at health outcomes for babies who were in utero during the
1918 pandemic. The authors found that the pandemic affected outcomes of the children
of pregnant mothers carrying them during the height of the pandemic for years to come
by reducing the children’s educational attainment, by increasing rates of disability, and
by those issues resulting in lower socio-economic status during the rest of their lives.
About a third of pregnant women contracted the virus during the pandemic, affecting
many children. Previous studies focused on nutrition as the largest factor affecting
subsequent health. This study found abrupt health declines for individuals born in 1919.
This data suggests that the pandemic was even more far reaching than otherwise noted.
Armenti, David. “Facing the Great War: World War I and the Beginnings of Modern
Rehabilitation.” Maryland Historical Society News (Spring 2015): 22-6.
This article contains information on the rehabilitation hospital built at Fort
McHenry for injured soldiers. The hospital served both black and white veterans of the
war, and it provided job training, disability accommodation, and rehabilitation for the
wounded veterans.
Barry, John M. “The Site of Origin of the 1918 Influenza Pandemic and its Public Health
Implications.” Journal of Translational Medicine 2004, no. 2 (2004): 3. DOI:
10.1186/1479-5876-2-3. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC340389/
(accessed November 8, 2014).
Barry writes that recent scholarship estimates from 50-100 million dead in the
pandemic of 1918. Barry presents evidence for the site of origin of the epidemic as
Haskell County, Kansas, in January 1918. He believes that public policy implications are
likely if this hypothesis is correct. Other hypotheses presented are that the pandemic
began in Asia, specifically in China and spread by Chinese or Vietnamese laborers either
crossing to the US or working in France, and that the pandemic originated in a British
Army post in France where what British physicians called “purulent bronchitis” erupted
in 1916. Barry states that those deaths bear a striking resemblance to the influenza of
1918. Barry debunked those theories, citing studies that found no hard evidence or data
of them being true. Barry sites Dr. Edwin Jordan’s work as identifying the lethal diseases
of the past as pneumonic plague rather than influenza. Barry remained committed to the
origin of the pandemic being put firmly in the United States and spread by the movement
of troops to Europe. This article provides much information for the background on the
pandemic’s origin.
Breen, William J. “Black Women and the Great War: Mobilization and Reform in the
South.” The Journal of Southern History 44, no. 3 (August 1978): 421-40.
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Breen’s article follows Southern women through the period of the war,
commenting on their mobilization as a group to help in the home war effort, and at the
continuing discrimination and segregation they encountered. Important to my work, he
found that Red Cross canteen workers in the south excluded southern black women, as
they did not want blacks to wear the canteen worker uniform. In other areas, some white
and black women worked together, but in the south black women faced more racial
discrimination.
Bristow, Nancy K. “’It’s as Bad as Anything Can Be’: Patients, Identity, and the
Influenza Pandemic.” Public Health Reports 125, S3 (2010): 134-44.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2862342/ (accessed November 11,
2014).
Bristow supplied background information on pandemic, and much of it specific to
Maryland. Bristow notes a sense of disturbance in society with the influenza epidemic.
The Red Cross in Baltimore reported that several cases reported by nurses were of two or
three sick patients in one bed at a time, sometimes with a dead body. Larger cities such
as Baltimore had decomposing bodies in the mortuaries and morgues because they could
not bury them quickly enough. Some bodies lay unclaimed because family members
were too sick to claim them.
Britten, Rollo H. “The Incidence of Epidemic Influenza, 1918-19: A Further Analysis
According to Age, Sex, and Color of the Records of Morbidity and Mortality
Obtained in Surveys of 12 Localities.” Public Health Reports (1896-1970) 47,
no. 6 (February 5, 1932): 303-39.
Public health reports outlined a re-canvassing of various localities; especially
important were the re-canvassing of Baltimore, some small towns in Maryland, and the
Maryland rural area of Charles County. These re-canvasses accomplished after the
autumn wave of the epidemic to see if things had changed since the earlier fall
canvassing. These studies recorded name, color, sex, and age at last birthday, and if the
person had gotten sick with influenza or other illness. Important, inspectors recorded
their impression of the economic status of the family as “well to do,” “moderate,” “poor”
or “very poor.” The study also recorded pneumonia incidence. The study found that
mortality statics gave results similar to those derived from morbidity statistics. In all, one
out of every three or four people in the canvassed populations including Baltimore
reported that they had influenza during the fall wave of the epidemic and later recurrence.
Importantly this study provided the army incidence figures during the fall wave in order
to compare that figure with that of Baltimore during the same period.
Brundage, John F., and G. Dennis Shanks. “Deaths from Bacterial Pneumonia during the
1918-19 Influenza Pandemic.” Emerging Infectious Diseases 14, no. 8 (August
2008); 1193-99.
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This study of secondary bacterial pneumonia deaths dispels the myth that the
influenza germ itself was especially virulent and fatal. Rather, the authors present data to
prove that the bacterium responsible for pneumonia was the real culprit.
Byerly, Carol R. “The US Military and the Influenza Pandemic of 1918-1919.” Public
Health Reports 125 (April 2, 2010): 81-91.
This article contains statistical information on the influenza infection rate in the
military during 1918. According to their most conservative counts, the Army counts 26%
infection rate and more than 30,000 deaths before the troops arrived in France for the war
effort. The naval statistics also reflect how intertwined the influenza pandemic was with
the war.
Cassidy, Chris, Craig T. Palmer, and Lisa Sattenspiel. “Boats, Trains, and Immunity: the
Spread of the Spanish Flu on the Island of Newfoundland.” Newfoundland and
Labrador Studies 22, vol. 2 (2007): 473-504.
Cassidy, Palmer, and Sattenspiel studied virus immunity and its relevance to the
spread of the flu on the island of Newfoundland. They specifically addressed various
transportation modes as causative agents of the spread, examining shipping and boat
travel, railroad travel, and immunities gained during exposure to the less fatal spring
1918 influenza outbreak.
De Jong, J.C., E.C.J. Claas, A.D.M.E. Osterhaus, R.G. Webster, and W. L. Lim. “A
Pandemic Warning?” Nature 389 (9 October 1997): 554. DOI: 10.1038/39218
(accessed December 16, 2014).
According to the authors, works published in the 1990s and early twenty-first
century often contained new questions. Authors increasingly asked why the 1918
pandemic was so fatal. This short article examined renewed interest in the 1918
pandemic that occurred in conjunction with deaths in Asia from Hong Kong flu in 1997,
and the continuing AIDS pandemic.
Erkoreka, Anton. “Origins of the Spanish Influenza Pandemic (1918-1920) and its
relation to the First World War.” Journal of Molecular and Genetic Medicine 3,
no. 2 (December 2009): 190-4.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2805838/ (accessed November 7,
2014).
The article contained general information about the pandemic and the author’s
hypothesis about where it initially came from. Unlike most other works about the
pandemic, this author attributed a wave of influenza early in 1920 as the fourth wave of
the pandemic virus. In Europe, the total mortality for the entire pandemic event was
between 1.1% and 1.2%. This information might be pertinent for the general influenza
facts chapter. The author argued that the 1918-1919 epidemic evolved from the
pandemic virus of 1889-90. He further presented evidence that there was an earlier first
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wave than commonly accepted, in December 1916-March 1917. This earlier influenza
event had the heliotrope cyanosis and purulent bronchitis so commonly reported in the
1918 pandemic. During WWI, French colonial troops from Indochina, Africa, and
Oceania helped to spread the virus to the rest of the world. Reports note that Indochinese
troops experienced an epidemic in April 1918. An epidemic was reported in France in
the 3rd Army from April 20 to November 1918.
Eyler, John M. “The State of Science, Microbiology, and Vaccines Circa 1918.” Public
Health Reports (1974-) 125, S3 (April 2010): 27-36.
Many vaccines were developed and administered during the 1918-1919 pandemic,
but there were conflicting claims of their success. Pfeiffer’s bacillus was thought to be
the probable cause of influenza in 1918, and people had high hopes of a vaccine being
developed. There were already successful vaccines against rabies, typhoid, and
diphtheria. Drug manufacturers promoted their stock vaccines as working for the
influenza virus, often keeping the ingredients of their concoctions secret. Price gouging
and kickbacks became common as the epidemic grew. Some researchers developed what
they purported to be a vaccine against Pfeiffer’s bacillus using techniques learned in
previous vaccine development. The vaccines were widely used, and those reporting on
the vaccine efficacy nearly always reported that the vaccine was effective in preventing
influenza.
Fraser, Christope, Derek A. T. Cummings, Don Klinkenberg, Donald S. Burke, and Neil
M. Ferguson. “Influenza Transmission in Households During the 1918
Pandemic.” American Journal of Epidemiology” 174, no. 5 (July 11, 2011): 50514.
The author examined and extrapolated the data in the Frost study cited in
“primary sources” above, finding that up to 22% of the population of Baltimore may have
been immune from earlier influenza waves before the especially virulent fall wave of
influenza. Frost based his findings on the survey of 7187 Maryland households
conducted in the fall of 1918. The authors stated the significance of Frost’s data
reporting that Frederick, Maryland, suffered a higher influenza attack rate in the fall wave
than Baltimore suggested that partial immunity in Baltimore’s population was due to the
influx of war workers from other areas carrying immunity from mild influenza infections
they suffered in the spring wave. Frederick had no such influx of workers, thus their
attack rate was higher than in Baltimore.
Gagnon, Alain, Matthew S. Miller, Stacey A. Hallman, Robert Bourbeau, D. Ann
Herring, David JD Earn, and Joaquin Madrenas. “Age Specific Mortality During
the 1918 Influenza Pandemic: Unravelling the Mystery of High Young Adult
Mortality.” Plos One 8, no. 8 (August 2013): 1-9.
Gagnon and his group studied the high mortality rates for young adults during the
1918 influenza pandemic. They believed that T-cell dysregulation from exposure to an
earlier and dissimilar strain of influenza in the Russian flu epidemic of 1889-90 is to
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blame for the high death rate. Peptides in the Russian virus created a higher level of antiviral action in the body, leading to the person being especially prone to fatal bacterial
pneumonia as a secondary complication of influenza. This bacterial pneumonia is what
killed the young and strong individuals. The authors then discussed their data analysis
leading to their argument that “original antigenic sin” meant that 1918 influenza victims
with Russian flu exposure revealed little immunological response against the 1918 strain,
but rather a strong response directed toward the Russian strain they encountered as
children.
Gamble, Vanessa Northington. “‘There Wasn’t a Lot of Comforts in Those Days:’
African Americans, Public Health, and the 1918 Influenza Epidemic.” Public
Health Reports 125, sup. 3 (2010): 114-22.
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2862340/ (accessed November 11,
2014).
By 1918, medical and public health reports documented that blacks suffered
higher morbidity and mortality rates than whites for several diseases like tuberculosis,
pneumonia, diarrheal diseases. The death rate was slightly less for scarlet fever, cancer,
and liver disease. The overall black death rate was 2 or 3 times higher than white.
Blacks lived in the least desirable and most disease-ridden neighborhoods. Blacks had to
make their own separate hospitals, facilities, and organizations to take care of themselves.
Racism, legalized segregation restricted black patients, and doctors to health care
facilities. Racist scientific theories operated on notions of blacks’ biological,
physiological, and moral inferiority. Black immorality, intemperance, and congenital
poverty were seen in era society as inherent race traits. Contradicting prevailing theories
exist about blacks having increased susceptibility to disease. It appears that incidence of
influenza in the 1918 epidemic was lower in blacks. However, according to other
authors, pneumonia incidence and fatality was greater in blacks than whites, upping the
death rates of blacks. In Baltimore, black public health activists viewed actions against
housing segregation as inextricably linked to efforts to fight tuberculosis. Black health
professionals created programs to teach personal hygiene and sanitation, especially to the
poor blacks and to recent migrants from the South. Nationwide, hospitals either denied
blacks admission or accommodated them, almost universally, in segregated wards, often
placed in undesirable locations such as unheated attics and damp basements.
In Baltimore, the epidemic overwhelmed the capacity of the 40-bed Provident
Hospital, the only facility for black patients, and the hospital had to turn patients away.
The Baltimore Afro-American criticized the situation as the pitiable result of the Jim
Crow policy practiced in white hospitals in the city, and the woeful lack of larger quarters
in Provident. Observations that blacks had lower morbidity and mortality rates from the
influenza epidemic were not universal.
Gibbs, Mark J., and Adrian J. Gibbs. “Molecular Virology: Was the 1918 Pandemic
Caused by a Bird Flu? Was the 1918 flu Avian in Origin? Nature 440, no. 7088
(April 27, 2006): E9-10.
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The authors discuss the Taubenberger sequencing of the genes of the pandemic
virus. Taubenberger, et al, assert that the virus crossed from birds to humans just prior to
the start of the pandemic, and that the virus did not emerge from gene re-assortment.
However, the Gibbs’ argue that the evidence in the study does not support the conclusion
that the pandemic virus came from birds. Rather, they believe that the virus evolved in
mammals and that evidence proved it developed through re-assortment. Gibbs’ also
disputed the Tauberger group’s assertion that the 1918 virus is traceable through all viral
descendent trees. The Gibbs paper says that the results do not prove the virus to be avian
at all, rather the virus evolved in people or pigs for quite a while prior to the pandemic
beginning in 1918.
Gillis, Anna Maria. “The Devastation of 1918: Finding Pockets of Hope in the Great Flu
Pandemic.” Humanities 35, no. 2 (March/April 2014).
http://www.neh.gov/humanities/2014/marchapril/feature/the-devastation-1918
(accessed October 1, 2015).
Gillis added research from the CDC to analyze actions taken during the pandemic
to see what worked and what did not. She found that cities that made early decisions to
close schools, cancel public gatherings, and isolate and quarantine, and were consistent in
these efforts did better in terms of mortality than those who did not. Gillis looked into
Baltimore closing their public schools on October 8 and prohibiting public gatherings in
some cases, finding that the pandemic persisted there until March 16, 1919, the first day
that no flu cases reported in the city since the beginning of the fall wave the previous
September. Baltimore suffered 4125 deaths
Gover, Mary. “Negro Mortality: I. Mortality from All Causes in the Death Registration
States.” Public Health Reports (1896-1970) 61, no. 8 (February 22, 1946): 25965.
The report lists mortality rates for geographic sections for black citizens, and life
expectancy tables. Gover does say that immediately following the influenza epidemic,
black mortality was exceptionally low for several years. This low mortality for 1919-21
resulted in a greater life expectation at certain ages, but life expectancy dropped again for
1929-31 to more average death rates. Mortality dropped for blacks and whites of all ages
from 1910 to the 1940s, though the rate of mortality is higher for blacks than whites in
every decade.
Hobday, Richard A., and John W. Cason. “The Open-Air Treatment of Pandemic
Influenza.” American Journal of Public Health 99, no. 52 (October 2, 2009):
S236-42.
Hobday and Cason discuss the theories of open-air treatment used by some
practitioners during the H1N1 Influenza pandemic of 1918-19. Any type of therapy for
those suffering from bacterial pneumonia was futile. A common practice in 1918 was to
put sick patients outside in tents or open wards. Dr. John Lettsom established the “openair” treatment method for children suffering from TB. He treated the children with fresh
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air, gentle exercise, and a nutritious diet with good results. Florence Nightingale also
supported sunlight and fresh air as part of hospital cures for patients, though the idea
gained little approval at that time.
Howard, Jennifer. “Big Data Project on the 1918 Flu Reflects Key Role of Humanists.”
Chronicle of Higher Education 61, no. 25 (March 6, 2015): A12.
Howard records the research project undertaken by E. Thomas Ewing at Virginia
Tech to look at how reporting on the pandemic flu spread in 1918, and especially at the
influence that Royal Copeland, health commissioner of New York City, had in shaping
influenza responses in the rest of the country.
Humphries, Mark Osborne. “Paths of Infection: The First World War and the Origins of
the 1918 Influenza Pandemic.” War in History 21, no. 1 (January 2014): 55-81.
Humphries examined the effect of the First World War on the influenza
pandemic’s outcomes. He noted that other deadly historical epidemics occurred when
new transportation modes or routes brought formerly isolated populations with each
other. The Great War brought disease from one area to another that likely would not
otherwise spread. The first wave over deaths and sickness would have gone unnoticed
except for the fatal second wave causing most of the pandemic’s deaths. But the first
wave caused the world’s armies to suffer from influenza, whereas the second wave
brought death from secondary pneumonia infections. Battlefield disease have always
been intertwined, but the great war’s mobilization of giant armies coming together on
foreign battlefields likely helped the fatal second wave to develop. Humphries likens this
movement of large groups of people to the outward movement of people from Europe to
the New World and eventual European colonies, causing epidemics that killed off large
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